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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study which aims to explore the cultural dimensions of 
Ottoman politics and state tradition. The present study is an analysis of the 
components of the political culture of the Ottomans until the end of the 
sixteenth century. The components creating the sui generis political culture 
of the Ottomans treated in this thesis are that of Islamic, Byzantine and 
Turco-Iranian origin. An integral part of this study is also concerned with the 
continuity and discontinuity of the Ottoman political culture in modem 
Turkey. In the light of the above findings, the politico-cultural dimensions of 
current relations of Turkey with the West are presented from the standpoint 
of cultural history. 
OZET 
Bu tez Osmanh imparatorlugu'nun devlet gelenegi ve siyasi yap1smm killtiirel 
boyutlanm incelemektedir. Buraclaki ~ah~ma Osmanhlann siyasi killtiiriiniin 
onaltmc1 yiizyil sonuna kadar ogelerini analiz etmektir. Bu tezde ele alman 
Osmanhlann nev-i ~ahsma miinhastr siyasi killtiiriiniin ogeleri islam, Bizans 
ve Tiirk-iran kokenlerinden gelmektedir. Bu ~ah~mamn onemli bir par~as1 
da Osmanh siyasi killtiiriiniin ~agd~ Tiirkiye'deki devamhhg1 ve kesintisidir. 
Yukandaki verilerin i~1gmda Tiirkiyenin Bat1yla olan siyasi-killtiirel 
ili~kilerinin boyutlan killtiir tarihi boyutundan sunulmaktadtr. 
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CHAPTERJ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a study which aims at exploring the cultural dimensions of 
Ottoman politics and state tradition. Various foreign influences that contributed to 
the creation of the Ottoman political identity are analyzed using the method of 
content analysis in a historical context. The second chapter aims at the analysis of 
various forces of Islamic background which became the components of the 
Ottoman political culture until the end of the sixteenth century. The transformation 
of the use of ideals stemming from an Islamic background, as well as their 
outcomes and the flavour that they gave to the Ottoman state tradition are 
explored, taking into consideration, the historical process in which the Ottoman 
state gradually became a world empire. 
The third chapter aims at analyzing various socialization processes pertaining 
to political behaviour and traditions of Byzantine and Turco-Iranian origin which 
deeply influenced the Ottoman political culture, especially during the course of 
transformation of the Ottoman state into an empire starting at the second half of 
the fifteenth century. The aim of this chapter is to show the heterogeneity of the 
components of the Ottoman political culture, of foreign origins, which resulted in 
creating the sui generis, oriental concept of an empire in the Ottoman state. The 
adoption of similar methods by Byzantium of cultural, political and historical 
symbols are especially of interest in this chapter. 
The fourth chapter aims at analyzing the forces of continuity as well as 
discontinuity in Turkey of the Ottoman political culture, taking into consideration 
the cultural-crisis in which Turkey and the Middle East region find themselves. 
Special reference to the causes and manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism within 
a politico-cultural context, based on the findings of the previous chapters are 
among the current domestic as well as international dimensions of this study. 
The concluding fifth chapter makes an evaluation of the whole study, in an 
attempt to comprehend the cultural dimensions of domestic and international 
politics, m a world where increasing cultural misunderstanding and 
incomprehension stands in the way of peaceful and cooperative coexistence. In this 
respect, the problem of coexistence that Turkey is facing with the West today - a 
problem that the Ottomans did not face due to their relatively isolated cultural 
existence from the West - is the main issue of interest. In other words, what 
appears to be the greatest obstacle for cooperative coexistence with the West 
today, is the tension created by the forces of change and continuity of the Ottoman 
legacy. Hence the importance of a better comprehension of the socialization 
processes that affected political behaviour in the Ottoman Empire. 
It must be added that the aim of this thesis is not to prove the superiority or 
inferiority of neither the oriental nor the occidental cultures in any respect. Rather, 
it is hoped here that by the study of cultural dimensions of politics, an essential gap 
in the study of international relations could be filled. 
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CHAPTER2 
2. THE ISLAMIC FORCES IN OTTOMAN STATE TRADITION 
Religion is one of those forces in society that shape and form people at such 
a deep level, that oftentimes one tends to forget its colossal effect on human life. 
Every society is affected to a great extent by the dominant religion practiced. 
Although religion is basically concerned with the human being at an individual 
level, to bring the individual to liberation of the soul, the way in which most 
religions try to do this involves practices that also concern the society in which the 
individual lives. 
Mainly the monotheistic religions starting with Abraham and culminating 
with Mohammed -- the prophet of Islam -- put a lot of emphasis on the social 
context in which the individual lived. Judaism, Christianity and Islam set down 
many rules for the right conduct of life that the individual must follow (which 
comprise the external or formal aspect of religion), for the individual to enforce 
and live in faith. 
Islam is certainly no exception to this rule. Moreover, perhaps Islam is the 
foremost among the monotheistic religions that has prescribed more rules (together 
with Judaism) for the individual to follow, than many other religions born on the 
face of the earth. 
The aim of this chapter is to show how Islam affected the individual life 
and therefore the political identity of the Ottomans. It must be made clear from the 
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beginning that religions are brought and preached to people by prophets, and how 
that religion was intended by the carrier of the faith himself and how it gets 
interpreted by those who come after him are entirely different matters. Since the 
interpretations of a religion actualized shortly or long after the prophet's death (in 
the presence of the prophet he can interpret it himself), there usually occurs a need 
for some sort of an authority which claims to be the rightful interpreter. 
The duty of researchers therefore, is not to pass value judgements on the 
message of Islam as it was brought by the Prophet, but rather try to see how the 
message carried in this religion affected the political and social identity of the 
Ottomans in the period from the reign of Mehmet II until the end of the reign of 
Suleyman the Magnificent. In other words, the task is going to be to try to 
understand how Islam was interpreted by the Ottomans in a period of roughly a 
hundred and fifty years and to what political ideas and institutions it gave birth. 
The first part of this chapter is concerned with the historical and the 
theoretical background of Islam. In other words, the first part of the chapter, 
gives a picture of the cultural and religious background that gave the Ottomans the 
element that they could work with in the creation of part of their own culture. The 
second part of the chapter, examines how a certain interpretation of Islam came to 
be part of the official ideology of the Ottomans, taking into consideration also the 
change in the interpretation of Islam by the rulers and the Ulama from the 
beginning of the Empire into the sixteenth century. This period, starting with the 
conquest of Constantinople and its turning into Istanbul, marks the era that the 
Ottoman state turned gradually into an empire. 
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It can be said that Islam has three dimensions. Sachiko Murata and William 
Chittick mention these three dimensions of Islam as: Islam, Iman, and Ihsan. Islam 
refers to submission, Iman refers to faith and Ihsan refers to doing what is good 
and beautiful. In other words, "Islam refers to religion pertaining to acts, Iman is 
religion as it pertains to thoughts and Ihsan is religion as it pertains to intentions. 
These three dimensions of religion coalesce into a single reality called Islam." ( 1) 
In other words, man needs all these three dimensions of thought, intention 
and action for a pure and beautiful life. The way that Islam enables the individual to 
reach this state of purity and bliss is through the understanding and living of the 
five pillars of Islam which are: Shahadah, Salat, Fasting , Hajj and Zakat. 
Shahadah comes from witnessing and witnessing here means the acceptance and 
feeling as a part of a Muslim's life, the fact that "there is no other God but one and 
that Mohammed is his creation (servant) and messenger". Sa/at is the prayer or 
encounter of the individual with God which is the duty of the Muslim to perform 
five times daily. Fasting is abstinence from food and drinks as well as sexual desire 
from dawn to sun set in the month of Ramadan. Hajj is the pilgrimage task of 
every Muslim that can afford it to the house of God to congregate with other 
Muslims. Finally Zakat is giving a part of every wealthy Muslim's possessions to 
the needy for charity. There is also the sixth element which is considered by the 
same authorities as the sixth pillar of Islam which is Jihad. 
It is on this supposed sixth pillar that it would be useful to deepen the 
vision of Islam a little. 
The word Jihad comes from the root mujahada in Arabic 
which means fight or struggle. The Koranic usage of the word 
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Jihad is far broader than the political use of the word might 
imply. Most commonly, the Koran uses the verb along with the 
expression 'in the path of God'. The 'path of God' is of course 
the oath of right conduct that God has set down in the Koran 
and the example of the Prophet. (2) 
In other words, once the individual has surrendered to God his partial wisdom, to 
be able to make his wisdom whole and therefore holy, he should fight against the 
lower self (Satan) within himself to attain the Higher Self (God). Certainly, as in 
the time of the Prophet, outer Jihad has also been necessary to preserve and give 
the new faith in an environment inimical towards it. However, the authority to 
decide whether an outer Jihad should take place or not was the Prophet. After his 
death, many wars against the "infidels" came to be marketed in the name of Jihad, 
conducting a political war beneath the veil of holiness. 
The place of Jihad in the divine plan is typically illustrated by 
citing words that the Prophet uttered on one occasion when he 
had returned to Medina from a battle with the enemies of the 
new religion. He said, 'We have returned from the lesser Jihad 
to the greater Jihad.' The people said, 'O Messenger of God, 
what Jihad could be greater than struggling against the 
unbelievers with the sword?' He replied, 'Struggling against the 
enemy in your own breast.' (3) 
Aside from what Jihad originally meant and what it has meant to the Islamic states 
in history as well as what kind of connotations it still has today, it should be 
emphasized that for the Ottomans also, the practice of Jihad became a political 
institution. However, the Ottomans have by no means been the only Islamic state 
that has turned Jihad into a political institution. Jihad has been as such almost 
invariably in every Islamic state and to a great extent, still continues to be so for 
many Muslim states which have not even necessarily adopted the Shariah as their 
official state ideology. 
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At this point, it would be useful to have a look at the term Shariah which 
gave birth to all sorts of schisms as well as divergence within Islam such as 
Sunnism or Shi'ism and the different madhhabs that were born within Sunnism 
itself 
Nowadays, the term Shariah is taken for granted as if everyone understands 
for what it stands. The fact is that, even among those who know or understand 
what Shariah is, there are divergencies of opinion as to what it represents for them. 
Is there a uniform definition of Shariah? 
The word Shariah in Arabic simply means "the road leading to water". In 
other words, Shariah represents the rules and regulations set down by the Koran 
and the Prophet Mohammed for Muslims for the right conduct of inner and outside 
life to protect and inforce the Islam, Iman and Ihsan, as mentioned earlier. 
Naturally with the passing of time after the Prophet's death, the Islamic theologists 
and jurists tried to create rules for the individual's. inner and social life within the 
line set by the Koran and the Prophet. The codification of all these rules and 
regulations created the Islamic jurisprudence called Flqh. There have been a corpus 
of scholars in the Islamic tradition, some of whom concentrated more on the 
theological and philosophical aspects of Islam and some of whom concentrated 
more on the jurisprudence aspect. Theology means more or less the philosophy of 
religion, i.e. the theory of knowledge on various aspects of religion. Jurisprudence 
means the science of law. The particularity of Islam that perhaps differs it from 
other religions is that, it is perhaps the religion on the face of the earth where these 
two realms of jurisprudence and theology have merged most, whereby one does 
not know where jurisprudence starts and theology ends and the other way around. 
This is a result of the historical conditions under which Islam flourished in the 
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Arabian peninsula, and a consequence of a particular approach to spirituality that 
combines this world with the other world, where the division is much more 
emphasised in other religions such as Christianity or Hinduism. 
It is not the intent here to make a comparative analysis of Islam and other 
religions. However, it is necessary to note this aspect of Islam which sees the outer 
way that one lives as a mirror of the inner way one is. 
Another peculiarity of Shariah (which is the rules and regulations set down 
by the Koran an the Prophet) is that it covers a larger extent of human life (both 
individual and social) than laws brought by other religions. 
One of the reasons that the word law is not appropriate to refer 
to everything dealt with the Shariah is the connotations of the 
English word. To begin with, we think of law as commands 
and prohibitions. Not only does Shariah tell people what they 
must do and what they must not do, it also tells them what they 
should do and what they should not do, and it tells them 
explicitly that many things are indifferent. Hence we are faced 
with five categories of actions: the required, the recommended, 
the indifferent, the reprehensible and the forbidden. (4) 
Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) is the codification of Shariah and it is in fact 
this part that needs to be studied if one wants to understand what kind of an effect 
Islam had on the Ottomans, or rather, what sort of an effect a certain 
interpretation, or the adoption of a certain interpretation of Islam had for the 
Ottomans. Accordingly, one should examine how the various schools· of 
jurisprudence in Sunni Islam (to which the Ottomans belonged) and within these 
schools how the school of Abu-Hanifa (to which the Ottomans belonged) created a 
jurisprudence of its own, which later on, came to predominate the theological 
aspects oflslam. 
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One of the important reasons that the Ottomans made Shariah the backbone 
of their judicial system and conformed and incorporated the Or.ft Kanun (laws 
emanated by the will of the Sultan) into Shariah is because after the conquest of 
Constantinople, the Ottoman state gradually became a multi-ethnical and a multi-
religious empire. That is to say, although the Ottomans made use of Shariah 
before the conquest of Constantinople as well, it became the state doctrine and the 
umbrella under which the multi-ethnic and multi-religious peoples of the empire 
were covered after the conquest of Constantinople. It is not surprising to see that 
after the Muslims emigrated to Medina from Mecca during the Prophet's time, the 
community was also reorganized according to the law of "Umma" which was 
based on the sharing of the new faith and not according to the valid tribal laws until 
that time.(5) Similar to the Ottoman case (though not identical) the new 
community in Medina was organized according to the new constitution of Medina, 
making Mohammed the new legislator in a city whose population not only was 
composed of Muslims, but non-converted Arabs and Jews as well. (Jews 
constituted half the population in the city at that time). The alliance between the 
Jews and the Arabs of Medina for the common defense of Medina against the 
Qarish tribe facilitated the constitution whose 23rd and 42nd articles complemented 
each other as: "In any controversy, submit yourselves to God and Mohammed." ( 6) 
This first constitution of Medina accomplished under the legislator figure of the 
Prophet was called "Convention established by the messenger of God between the 
emigrants and auxiliaries and for the peace with the Jew." (7) 
One cannot do but think that this success of the Prophet of Islam and Islam's 
claims to universality have affected the Islamic State tradition, including that of the 
Ottomans, especially after Mehmet II and the conquest of Constantinople. In other 
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words, Islam provided the Ottomans by the second half of the 15th century both 
the historical example of the Prophet in practice and the claim of Islam being a 
universal religion in theory. The combination of the two, made Islamic tradition 
and Shariah a perfect tool for Ottoman claims for a universal empire, that is, a 
perfect means oflegitimacy. 
To come back to the argument of the vanous schools of Sunni Islam 
(madhhab), it is necessary to look at how the various Hadith (words of the 
Prophet) and Sunna (any tradition in early Islam on any relative aspect of law 
and/or religion) gave birth to an elaborate and intricate Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh). By understanding the standpoint of the Hanafi school, one will be able to 
understand the complex state structure of the Ottomans based on Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
From the words of the Prophet or words attributed to him, a corpus of 
prophetic tradition was created. The Hadith are about the most detailed and diverse 
aspects of public and private life, including judgements, acts and sentences. The 
Hadith became the natural extension of the revelation of Islam. They were passed 
on from generation to generation and from the Arabian peninsula onto remote 
corners of the world by faithful Muslims whose mission was to deliver the message 
of Islam to those who did not know it. 
"From the second generation of the comrades of the Prophet 
onwards, an entire corporation of Hadith tellers was established. Hadith became 
al-'ilm (the science) par excellence and the fourteen main sources of Hadith 
gradually received a judicial character." (8) As time passed, the ulama speculated 
to resolve how the Prophet would have acted in a certain situation (as a part of the 
taqlid or imitation tradition). These speculations were extended into every detail of 
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daily life as well as to public and private aspects of jurisdiction, and gave definite 
forms to social and religious life, and institutions. The Sunnah provided a lot of 
power to the ulama because the taqlid of the Prophet (who set the perfect 
example) was the way that would lead to a perfect life in the name of God. These 
speculations of the ulama are called bidil (innovation), which meant to adapt the 
Shariah according to the needs of the times. The bida tradition started as early as 
the 9th century. Although some traditionalists have completely been against bida, 
some other ulama preferred to make a distinction between a good and a bad bidil. 
If these traditions against innovation had completely succeeded (as in the 
I 0th century Maghreb) it would have been impossible to live differently from the 
first 30 years of Islam in Medina. (9) However, a principle was formulated by the 
famous theologist Ash-Shafi: 
An innovation that goes against the Koran, a sunna or a 
tradition that goes back to the comrades of the Prophet or that 
goes against common sense (ijma) is a heretic innovation. 
However when something new which is not evil in itself is 
introduced that does not contrast the above mentioned 
authorities in the religious realm, then it is a laudable 
innovation. (10) 
Islamic jurisprudence has four main sources: I) the interpretation of the Koran a) 
taken as literal meaning by the Sunnis b) taken as allegorical meaning by the Shiites 
and the Sufis 2) the sunna and the Hadith 3) ijtihad or commonsense reflection 
when a matter is left unanswered in the Koran or/and the hadith 4) ijma or 
consensus of the ulama. 
Abu-Hanifa is the greatest scholar of the Hanafi school, after whom the 
madhhab is named. The Hanafi school developed ijtihad more than taqlid probably 
because the messengers sent by the caliph Omar to Iraq ( where the Hanafi 
11 
madhhab was born ) emphasized the teachings of the Koran over that of the 
Hadith, therefore leaving a large margin of unresolved issues for ijtihad. The 
innovation of hanafism was the emphasis put on personal opinion (ra '.Y) and 
preferential option (istihsan) in jurisprudence. This developed a jurisdiction that left 
a large margin of freedom to adopt reasoning which conforms itself to diverse 
historical and social circumstances. ( 11) 
The aspect of Hanafism which is often criticized is that it put greater 
emphasis on jurisprudence (fiqh) than on theology (kalam), which came to be the 
reason of a sterile philosophical tradition in the countries adopting Hanafism, as 
well as in the Islamic world in general ( since almost half of the Islamic world today 
belongs to the Hanafi madhhab alone). (12) There is much affinity between this 
claim and the fact that the Ottomans, although they created powerful states with 
complicated administrative structures and ideologies, did not create a sui generis 
political theory as well as failing to create an original philosophy whose origins lie 
purely within the indigenous Ottoman intelligentsia. ( 13) On the other hand, the 
other three madhhabs of Sunni Islam ( Hanbalism, Malikism and Shafism ) have 
been even stricter with bida ' and the adaptation of Islam to the needs and 
circumstances of diverse times and conditions. In the face of these facts, it could be 
considered that Sufism was the only trend that made an effort to adapt Islam to the 
particular needs of a certain time. 
Sufism is therefore, an important heterodox aspect of Islam. The political, 
social and the philosophical role that the sufis played in the Ottoman Empire will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Sufism in Islam is what we may call mysticism in English. The Sufi approach 
in Islam is also based on the Koran and the acceptance of the fact that Mohammed 
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is God's prophet and messenger. However, as far as the attainment of the divine 
truth is concerned, the sufi way is that of kashf (discovery). In other words, faith is 
used only as a step towards personal discovery or experiencing of truth, through 
the path of love. Sufism emphasizes the tasbih principle in Islam ( the fact that the 
manifest world is not separate from the creator or God, since God created the 
world in His own image, there is oneness between the Creator and the created). 
Therefore kashf means experiencing this oneness. The complementary aspect of 
tasbih in Islam is tanzih ( which means that the Creator and the created are distinct 
from each other, but not separate). Sunni orthodox Islam in the Ottoman Empire, 
as part of the state ideology emphasizes especially tanzih in the figure of the 
sultan, him being above his subjects, in other words being "zillullah fi'l ardh"( the 
shadow of God on earth). This has been balanced by the tasbih element in the 
Ottoman tradition by the jannisaries(who, formally belonged to the Bekt~i tariqa 
of sufism ), who shouted the following words at the beginning of each sultan's kz/19 
ku¥Jnma (coronation) to the sultan himself "Magrur olma Sultan1m, senden biiytik 
Allah var!"( 0 my Sultan, do not be proud, there is God greater than you!). 
The emphasis of the tasbih principle in sufism, or rather its political and 
social consequences got the sufis often in trouble with the political and religious 
authorities of their times. The most famous example is Mansur al-Hallaj who was a 
great sufi mystic, who was amputated and crucified in Baghdad, in 922 AD., for 
his so called heretic uttering: "an al-Haqq" (I am the truth). (14) 
The sufis have been revered as well as condemned on various occasions in 
Islamic countries, depending on the political and social implications of the tariqa to 
which they belonged. At various stages of the Ottoman history the Sufis clashed 
also with the official ideology of Sunni orthodox Islam. 
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The tariqas in the Ottoman Empire have been institutions 
where political oppositions were embodied and developed. In 
the Ottoman Empire, since the political power was legitimized 
in a religious form, also the political protest came in a religious 
form in the incarnation of the tariqas. The esoteric form of 
mysticism rather than the manifest aspect of religion, facilitated 
such a role. { 15) 
The Ottomans kept good relations with the tariqas while they were becoming a 
separate entity from the Selyuks, and made use of them for the legitimization of 
their state. However, as the Ottoman state developed and gained power, some of 
the tariqas became the focus of political opposition, making overt political 
demands, the state and the tariqas clashed. 
II 
It is widely accepted among historians that the Ottomans reached the height 
of their empire in the 16th century, concerning military might, social and religious 
institutions,as well as political influence, in the sense of becoming a world empire. 
By the time of the death of Siileyman the Magnificient, the Ottoman Empire was 
one of the greatest powers of the world, yet it would be oversimplistic to think that 
the Ottomans reached to such a degree of power solely due to supreme military 
ability and organization. 
In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire it usually takes more than 
military might to keep people together who belong to diverse groups and creeds. 
Legitimacy of the power of the sovereign, as well as the binding force to keep the 
social, political and religious institutions together, need a strong and deeply rooted 
ideology in which the subjects of the empire must believe. 
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In the process through which the Ottoman State became an empire, the 
uniting as well as the legitimizing power of Islam was the most important element, 
though not the sole force. Taking over the Byzantine state tradition, institutions, as 
well as a considerable part of their philosophy also played an important part in the 
legitimization process. Likewise, we cannot underestimate the Turkic traditions of 
inner Asian states. However, it seems that starting from the conquest of 
Constantinople, the Ottomans needed a firmer ideology which would be universal 
in nature. The nomadic or Turkic customs and traditions alone, were not sufficient 
to provide the Ottomans with such an ideological support any longer. 
The transition of the Ottomans from a tribal entity, in which the 
influence of those who belong to the Oguz tribe as well as of 
the Turks, was replaced by all sorts of non-Oguz and non-
Turks, including the islamicized converts. Although at the 
beginning of the Ottoman State, the descendants of Oguz tribes 
enjoyed a certain role by the side of the sultan until the midst of 
the 14th century, they were overtaken by the mass of federates, 
the islamicized and new men.(17) 
It is curious to note that the Ottomans started creating an ideology to give them 
legitimacy to rule not only within their own lands but also outside their own 
territories, starting shortly after when the tribal affinities began to lose influence. 
By the end of the reign of Siileyman in 1566, the Ottomans had 
created an ideology which not only justified the Ottoman 
sultan's rule in his own territories, but also bestowed on him a 
claim to universal sovereignty. These claims, and the beliefs 
which supported them, had developed between the late 
fourteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, becoming ever more 
grandiose with the continuing growth in Ottoman power. They 
did not derive from a single source or a single coherent set of 
ideas, but rather from an accretion and coalescence of myths 
and ideals, each of which had emerged at a different time to 
answer a particular political need or to appeal to a particular 
group of the sultan's subjects. However, all the elements in this 
complex ideology served the purpose of justifying the rule of 
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the Ottoman dynasty .... The Ottoman dynasty, like a large 
percentage of its subjects, was Muslim and Turkish and it was 
from within Muslim and Turkish tradition, both popular and 
learned, that it derived its claims to rulership and 
sovereignty.(18) 
The support of ideals coming from Islam and the Islamic traditions, were 
not only a powerful source oflegitimacy, but they also came to dominate the other 
two aspects as well (i.e. the Turkic and the Byzantine dimensions ).Therefore, this 
chapter is about how a certain interpretation of Islam became the arch-column of 
state ideology. In other words, this chapter is about how Islam al/a Ottomana was 
created. 
2. 1. ISLAM IN OTTOMAN LEGAL STRUCTURE 
The ulama in the Islamic world claimed by the end of the 9th century that 
the road for ijtihad was closed. (19) This meant that using one's intellect for the 
creation of law was not the case any more, since the Koran and the Hadith, which 
were the ultimate laws sent upon humanity through the Prophet, in their most 
perfect form, was what the Muslims had to obey. However, looking at the 
Ottomans, one sees that they not only made use of the Sharia , but also adopted 
quite a number of sultanic( orfi) laws which stemmed from the authority of the 
Sultan himself 
In this respect, it would be erroneous to think of Ottoman law as merely 
being restricted to Sharia. The sultanic law represented the sovereign's attaining an 
absolute role in the state and it also indicated the fact that the interest of the state 
was held above everything.(20) As it has been earlier pointed out, the Hanafi and 
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the Maliki madhhabs in Islam put emphasis on the strict following of the Koran 
and the Hadith. Hence within an ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam, the sultan 
or the caliph would not have had any power of promulgating laws, and his power 
would have been restricted to the preservation and the guardianship of Sharia. The 
case was quite different in the Ottoman Empire. The sultan was considered not 
only the protector and enforcer of the Sharia, but also one of the main sources of 
law. This was made possible based on a different concept of caliphate in Islam. 
Acording to Taner Timur, this different concept of caliphate goes back to the 
Abbasid dynasty. The process of the specialization of the kadhz (the term used for 
Shar 'i judges) institution which started at the time of the Umayyads, was 
completed by the time of the Abbasid dynasty. In this period, the kadhzs became 
fukaha(jurists), having specialized on various aspects of Islamic law. However, 
due to the increasing complexity of the social structure, Islamic law became 
inadequate to solve all the questions. These inadequacies manifested themselves 
especially in the areas of state government, economic issues and land 
administration. Under these circumstances, the caliph had the role of filling the 
gaps m areas where Sharia was inadequate or simply did not express any 
opinion.(21) 
The incorporation of sultanic law within the judicial system, which was a 
common practice in the Ottomans, was also a common practice in the former 
Turkish-Islamic states. Therefore it would be oversimplistic to think that the sole 
law for the Ottomans was Sharia. In fact, also the Abbasid state ( which was also a 
Hanafi state like most of the former Turkish-Islamic states) had brought many 
innovations to the Sharia, adapting it to an ever complex society as the conquests 
incorporated new peoples and customs into their state. The Ottomans, although 
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conforming sultanic laws into Sharia, always tried to increase the power of the 
sultan through the fetva system. Fetva was an emanation issued by the ulama 
stating that a sultanic law was in conformity with the Sharia. This system reached 
its utmost systematic form at the time of Siileyman the Magnificient and his 
Seyhiilislam, Ebussuud Efendi. However, fetvas were issued before Siileyman as 
well, not necessarily by the Seyhiilislam all the time, but by the kadUlsker or the 
muftu ( depending on whether we consider the muftus before Ebussuud Efendi real 
Seyhulislams. Since the title Seyhulislam was used for various heads of the ulama 
i.e. the Miiftii of lstanbul was called Seyhiilislam at the time of Mehmed the 
Conqueror ). (22) Therefore, probably it was not a coincidence that both the 
Abbasids and the Ottomans adopted the Hanafi school as their official doctrine, 
since it was the school of jurisprudence that gave the largest margin of power to 
the sultan. 
These considerations, however, should not mislead one to think that the 
sultan enjoyed unlimited power or that he could introduce any law without 
opposition of any kind. He was always bound by the customs and the institutions of 
Islam. From the very beginning of the Empire until the time when the state took its 
classical form under Siileyman, the rulers of the Empire formed a particular 
concept of Islam according to their own interests. In other words, one can assume 
that the margin of manipulation and active ideology- creating using Islam, when 
convenient, was higher than what one usually thinks in the Ottoman State. This 
peculiar concept oflslam is in fact Islam al/a Ottomana that was mentioned earlier. 
The relationship between the Ottoman ideology-makers and Islam was a 
relationship of convenience where religion provided the rulers with power, and, 
also imposed its restrictive rules upon the player of the game. One particular 
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consequence of Islam in the Ottoman Empire was that it had the paradoxical effect 
of strengthening as well as weakening the state. The power donating effect of 
Islam was the fact that it legitimized the ruler's power to the utmost. Serving the 
state was also serving religion, as disobeying the state meant also disobeying 
religion. Hence someone who disobeyed the sultan's authority was not only a 
rebel, but was also almost an infidel. In fact, many of the manifestations of 
rebellions against central authority were in the form of religious heterodoxies and 
were charged with infidelity as in the case of Ku:tlb~, Abdal and Shiite revolts, as 
in the case of the 16th century revolts, when persecutions heightened against the 
Ktztlb~ in the times of Bayezid II and his son Y avuz Selim. 
As to the weakening effect of Islam, it should be analyzed under two 
categories: the first aspect is that, for Islam to serve the purposes of the state, there 
had to be a firmly authoritative interpretation of the religion, but not an ultra-
orthodox interpretation ; the second aspect is that since the state and religion 
merged indistinguishably, at times when the sultan or the ruling elite were not 
strong enough, religion tended to undermine the power of the state, restricting its 
power. 
The authoritative tendencies in Islam were mentioned earlier, however , 
there have been incidents in the Ottoman Empire where Islam itself became a threat 
to the authority of the sultan, as a result of ultra-orthodox interpretations among 
the ulama. This category of ulama who appeared also at the time of Siileyman, 
were usually popular sheiks and ulama who preached and taught in the mosques, 
while the ulama in the higher medreses had a milder, but, always an authoritative 
tendency.(23) An example of the ultra-orthodox ulama is Mehmet of Birgi (1522-
73) who flourished between the years 1558-1565 when persecutions against the 
19 
K1zzlb~ were aflame. He condemned the visiting of tombs, shaking hands, 
bowing, kissing the hands or garment in greeting the sultan, payment of the 
religious officers for performing their services, and the institution of waqf, not to 
mention luxuries of the palace, and condemned even dancing and singing of the 
officially recognized and respected Mevlevi order. As these threats to the 
established order began to take hold among the poorer stratum of the society and 
the ulama, the Seyhiilislam Ebussuud Efendi had to issue a fetva to confirm the 
legality of the institutions attacked.(24) 
The Empire was held back at an intellectual level to adapt itself to the world 
with which it interacted , as a consequence of another weakening effect of Islam on 
the Ottoman State. In the absence of a strong ruling class, the Ottoman concept of 
Islam, having reached its classical and most powerful institutionalization at the time 
of Si.ileyman, was inept of free thought ( and counter-thought }, partly due to the 
lack of charisma of the sultans who came after him and most important of all, due 
to inherent weaknesses stemming from having made Islam the principle 
legitimizing fact. T~kopn1liizade's (important figure of the Ottoman ulama, 1495-
1561 ) ideas give a hint on these inherent weakness of Ottoman Islam in its 
incapacity for innovation and free thinking: 
T~kopn1liizade accepted al-Gazali's moderate views, 
believing that, like religious fanatics, batinites and philosophers 
were in error. The batinites sought to destroy the ~eriat, while 
the philosophers worked from principles unacceptable to Islam. 
(25) 
The fact of the absence of free thinking and innovation was not the sole fact 
that prevented the Ottomans from keeping pace with their time. Religion and 
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administration merged to such an extent that, for example, the kadht, who was the 
Islamic judge, was not only a part of the judicial organ, but embodied in his figure 
the administrative roles as well. As ilber Ortayh puts it, the kadh1 's competence 
extended from civil and penal code to lonca (guild), kale (citadel) and army 
inspections, the inspection of the tekkes of various tariqas and hass lands. (26) It is 
also interesting to note that the kadht had as his superior and inspector, not the 
sancak beyi but the kadiasker (the chief of the religious judicial system after the 
Seyhiilislam). (27) In other words, although a member of the religious-judicial 
institution could get engaged in administrative affairs, a secular administrative 
figure could interfere with the affairs of the kadhz. To return to the nature of the 
Ottoman law, as far as Sharia was concerned, the absence of free thinking in 
general is illustrated by the picture of the Ottoman fukaha and the Islamization 
process of the or.ft laws and secular institutions. 
The most renown Ottoman jurisprudence book was Multeka 
el-Ebhur written in the 16th century, at the time of Siileyman ( 
. . . ) If we consider that the Ottoman Empire gave more 
importance to judicial order and organization than it did to 
philosophical thinking, one grasps the importance of this book 
further ( ... ) In the Empire, the Multeka was under the hand of 
each kadhz in every court. However, it is difficult to concieve 
most of the Ottoman kadhzs as jurists capable of fully 
understanding the Multeka. Furthermore, in the complex social 
life of the Empire, there emerged always cases that the Multeka 
had not foreseen. (28) 
In the Ottoman Empire, the trend that the or.ft laws and the secular 
institutions reigned without the necessity of their Islamization, diminished 
gradually, contrary to rationale. This trend was replaced by another trend of 
Islamization especially in public law, particularly after the 17th century. (29) 
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2. 2. ISLAM IN EDUCATION AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 
The reason for extreme Islamization in state affairs should be found, to a 
great extent, in the fact that the Ottoman Empire did not produce an independent 
intelligentsia who took their ideas from independent rational thought. This was a 
result of the fact that philosophy was deliberately excluded from Ottoman 
education and the socialization of the individual. It goes without saying that the 
Ottomans were not influenced by the movement of the Enlightenment and 
Renaissance. Furthermore, the education system and indoctrination went so much 
hand in hand that with such a system of education it was impossible to have 
speculative-thought and an independent intelligentsia. The deep roots of Islamic 
influence in Ottoman law as well as state ideology was because there was no 
opposition or dialectic dynamics between the Ottoman academia and the ruling 
class. They tacitly agreed with each other and legitimized each other's power. 
Although this had the effect of a highly centralized government and firm political 
power, it also had the effect of a sterile philosophical tradition (if we define 
philosophy as speculative thought against religious dogma). It is useful, therefore, 
to have a look at the characteristics and structure of Ottoman education and 
intellectual life, to grasp the reason for the absence of an independent 
intelligentsia. 
Philosophy means, or rather implies that, it questions all life matters , free 
from dogma or religious creed. Furthermore, speculative-thought means doubting 
everything, posing issues to questioning and looking for alternatives to ready-made 
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"truths". Within the Islamic context, one may talk of such a movement of 
speculative-thought born in the 9th century. Farabi (870-950 AD.) and lbn-Sina 
(980-1037 AD., called Avicenna in the West) questioned many aspects of Islam 
and its dogmas, in an attempt to combine Islamic thought with the Ancient Greek 
heritage and philosophy. In fact, thefalasifa tradition in Islam produced some of 
the most sophisticated intellectuals of their time. However, this fertile period of 
speculative-thought or philosophy (although, it was never complete pure 
rationalism in its nature) regressed and fell once again under the religious dogmas 
in the 12th century. After this period onwards, the Islamic approach towards 
natural sciences, law, and philosophy has been a repetition or a re-interpretation of 
the former great thinkers of this tradition. The kalam tradition -which can be 
approximated to scholastic theology, in opposition to the falasifa tradition - is an 
example of an attempt to justify religious truth by intellectualizing, rather than 
genuinely doubting and questioning in a free spirit. The firm establishment of the 
four main madhhabs, (which coincides more or less to the 12th century) 
contributed to the petrification of free-thought. 
If one considers these trends in relation to the Ottomans, one sees that the 
Ottoman State was founded after the petrification of speculative-thought in the 
Islamic world in the 12th century. In fact, the Ottoman State was founded almost 
three hundred years after the Islamic tradition in philosophy when any alternative-
thought lost dynamism. It is upon this heritage that the Ottoman intellectual life 
was built. Members of a state could not go unaffected by the cultural heritage of 
their religion. Especially, if considering the degree of religion, merging within 
politics, and how religious some of the Sultans were (i.e. Bayezid II and Siileyman, 
to mention those only in the 16th century when the Empire reached its zenith) or 
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how religious they became towards the end of their lives, the effect of Islam will be 
better understood. 
Although strict periodization often does not explain important unorthodox 
thinkers like Ibn-Khaldun in the 14th century, the Ottomans were certainly affected 
by the Islamic scholasticism of their age. For instance, 
( .... ) the f alasifa-kalam clash continued in the Ottoman Empire 
and the falasifa-tendency thinkers like Fahrettin Razi and 
Nasreddin Tusi have been read and interpreted. However, we 
can generalize that the Ottoman civilisation has not been 
creative in philosophical thinking, and the Ottoman ulama 
always thought with the context of "interpretations" and the 
interpretations of interpretations. (3 0) 
Taner Timur points to the analogy drawn by Karl Marx between the 
Ottoman and the Roman Empire in Marx's work "Contribution a la Critique de 
l'Economie Politique", saying that there is a resemblance between the production 
modes of both empires and that both the Romans and the Turks continued the old 
production modes with great conservatism. Timur adds that, as the Roman Empire 
adopted the ancient Greek culture and spread it around in the lands that it 
conquered, the Ottomans also adopted the classical Islamic culture and spread it. 
He goes on to say that in spite of the intellectual awakening of Europe in the 13th 
century and even in spite of the Renaissance, taking into consideration that the 
scholastic thought reigned in Europe for centuries thereafter, the Ottomans 
remained a civilization of a global might until the 17th even the 18th centuries, 
considering that the Ottomans did not take part in the intellectual development of 
Europe. (31) The process that began concretely during the Renaissance against 
dogmatic thinking, took its definite form in Enlightenment. However, by then, the 
dogmas of Islam that affected Ottoman political structure which were petrified by 
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the end of the 16th century, continued without being affected by Europe to a great 
extent, with insignificant exeptions in the late 18th and 19th centuries. 
T~kopriiliizade's (1552-1621) Mevzuat-ul Ulum which may be considered 
as an encyclopaedia, classifies the sciences, explains, gives the areas of interest for 
each of these sciences and offers a bibliography to be consulted in each of these 
sciences. Mevzuat-ul Ulum reflects T~kopriiliizade's views based on the falasifa 
tradition from Farabi to lbn-Sina as being against the Sharia and degrades them. 
According to lbn-Sina and Farabi, falasifa was a reality, however there could only 
be one truth, therefore falasifa and religion were to be reconciled. The Ottoman 
ulama were affected mostly by the views of al-Ghazzali (11th century) and Ibn-
Haldun (14th century). Al-Ghazzali saw Plato and Aristotle as well as lbn-Sina 
and Farabi who were affected by these Greek philosophers, as heretics. According 
to al-Ghazzali, truth could only be achieved through wajd or religious ecstasy. He 
combined mysticism or Sufi elements with Islam. Therefore it is not surprising that 
Sufism (or its branches which did not clash with the state) affected the Ottoman 
state tradition to such extent. The Sufi idea of merging of the "lover" and the 
"beloved" in the mystic sense, was carried to the relationship between the Sultan 
and his subjects, in venerating the Sultan as a figure of authority, fear, respect and 
paradoxically enough, as an object of love. There are many examples of this 
mystification of the Sultan in Ottoman literature, especially in poetry. The gaze/ of 
Figani (d. 1532) is a good example of devotion to the sovereign in the Ottoman 
tradition: 
Esrar-1 'i~kun anlayah hayretin ~eha 
T erkib-i cismiim eyledi bad-1 fena gubar 
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KimdOr Figani dirsen eya Husrev-i zaman 
Bir derd esiri 'i~k ile Ferhad-1 ruzigar 
Since I came to realize the secret of the amazement of loving you, oh monarch! 
The wind of annihilation has turned the structure of my body to dust. 
If you ask who is Figani? Oh, Monarch of the age! 
He is a prisoner of pain, through the agency of love, the Ferhad of the times/fate. 
(32) 
The effects of mystic-religious thought as opposed to the speculative-thought 
was the basis of the Ottoman medrese (university) system and the whole of 
Ottoman education in general. The Medrese education was based on the following 
categorization: 
T~koprOlOzade recognises four stages of knowledge : spiritual, intellectual, oral 
and written parallel with the theory of creation in Islamic mysticism. All the 
sciences fall within one of the seven categories: 
A Caligraphic sciences: writing implements, styles of writing, 
etc. 
B. Oral sciences: the Arabic language and phonetics, 
lexicography, etymology, grammar and syntax, rhetoric, 
prosody, poetry, composition, history and the other literary 
sciences. 
C. Intellectual sciences: logic, dialectics 
D. Spiritual sciences: 
He divides the spiritual sciences into: 
1. Theoretical rational sciences: general theology, natural 
sciences, mathematics. 
2. Practical rational sciences: ethics, political science 
3. Theoretical religious sciences: the Koran and traditions of 
the Prophet, and the sciences devoted to their interpretation --
Koranic exegesis, the study of prophetic traditions, Islamic law 
and jurisprudence. 
4. Practical religious sciences: practical ethics, etiquette, ihtisab, 
and all subjects relating to Muslim life and worship. The goal of 
all knowledge and, in particular, of the spiritual sciences, is 
knowledge of God. (33) 
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It is probably because of this rigid thinking structure that the religious 
influences prevented the Ottomans from adopting new thoughts into their systems 
from Europe after the Enlightenment, not to mention the fact that few Ottomans at 
that stage, if any, could read a European language. This is also the reason why 
increasing Islamisation of the state appeared once power slipped away from the 
ruling class into the ever increasing power of the ulama. 
There can be found many examples of blocking speculative-thought among 
the ulama. An example is from the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, the most 
broad-minded of all the Ottoman sultans up to the beginning of the 17th century. 
Mehmed invited Alaeddin of Tus and Hocazade of Bursa (d.1488), to reopen the 
controversy between religion and philosophy, to discuss the matter and to write a 
treatise on the subject. The ulama of the day judged Hocazade's work superior to 
that of Alaeddin. Alaeddin, feeling humiliated, returned to his native Iran. 
Hocazade maintained that reason was delusive in theological questions, and led to 
errors while its application was impeccable in mathematics. Hocazade declared 
openly that his aim was to protect Sharia against philosophy.(34) The second 
example is from the time of Beyezid II. Molla Lutfi, who was a mathematician and 
a theologist, angered the ulama by open mockery of their superstitions. The case 
was carried to the Sultan, a committee of ulama was gathered to put Molla Lutfi 
under cross examination and he was beheaded with the charge of heresy and 
polytheism.(35) 
It was not enough to have a good bureaucracy and a good army to establish 
a world empire. The Ottomans needed a firm ideology and legitimacy as well. The 
most important mechanism of legitimacy was to make the religious education and 
judicial system function without direct interference from the ruling hierarchy, and 
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at the same time not to lose control over it by the ruling class. In other words, the 
ulama had to be independent enough from the civil servants and the military-
civilian bureaucracy , however, it also had to be dependent upon the Sultan. 
Another fact indicating the legitimising rule of education was that it was designed 
to educate the ulama and the servants of the Sultan as well as the upper classes but 
not the reaya (the producers). (36) Although in theory, Ottoman medrese 
education was open to all, the arduousness of the medrese system and its rigid 
hierarchy implied that only a chosen elite could benefit from it. 
The education of the askeri class had also its own devices. It had two 
recruiting systems: a position passing from father to son and the dev§irme system. 
The dev§irme were educated in the palace school called enderun. The Islamization 
of the de~irme (converts) started at very early ages. Although it is true that some 
Christian families were enthusiastic about their sons being recruited as dev§irme, 
considering the high promotion prospects as soldiers and statesmen in the Empire, 
their Islamization was a necessary fact. In the dev~irme case, perhaps the "zeal of 
the convert" was what the Ottomans benefited, likewise, the zeal of the newly 
converted Turks to Islam in the 10th century made them rise to high posts in the 
non-Turkic Islamic states. 
For both the civil servants and the ulama, the elementary education was 
given through the s1byan mektebi. S1byan mektebi enabled the child's religious 
socialisation by giving him knowledge about the reading of the Koran, the namaz 
(daily prayer) and the surahs of the Koran necessary to perform the namaz, as well 
as elementary writing skills(36) However, the child's intellectual abilities remained 
rather low in the s1byan mektebi. 
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Apart from these institutions directly related with the state, there were also 
the tariqas which had their own part in the education of the commoners as well as 
some part of the elite. As mentioned earlier, the tariqas or Sufi orders represented 
the heterodox aspect of Islam. The tariqas which came into existence in the 8th 
century in the Islamic world, and culminated in the 12th and 13th century in the 
Sel9uk State, have had the very important role of maintaining social solidarity, and 
preventing the society from breaking up in times of the lack of central authority, 
i.e. the Mogolian invasions of Anatolia in the 13th century. Therefore, their 
influence, especially among the rural classes of the Ottoman society and their 
education was of utmost importance. However, they were never made part of the 
official education system in the Empire. 
Another aspect of Ottoman political identity as a consequence of religious 
education, was its face where it merged with family and daily life. According to 
Robert Mantran, Islam as a religion was much less permissive that what 
Christianity had become in Europe in the 16th century. Therefore, all institutions as 
well as the political and social structure of the Empire, including daily life and 
practices were affected by the regulations of the Islamic religion.(37) He goes on to 
say that although the Turks still kept their ancestral tribal traditions in the society 
and political practice, by the 16th century, these tribal identities were almost totally 
replaced by Islamic traditions in the ruling class which formed the political identity 
in urban society.(38) 
In the urban family context, children of most fine families would, from the 
age of 6-7 were instructed by a !ala (caretaker), after which they went to the s1byan 
mektebi. The child was educated, from very early ages, to live according to Islam 
by parents and then climbed up the ladder of education through s1byan mektebi and 
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the medrese. In the daily context, the mosque also served , not only as a place of 
prayer, but also as a place of social-religious education and socialization. The 
mosques were places where the authority of the Sultan was consolidated with the 
hutbe (a special invocation whereby God was asked to extend his blessing upon the 
Sultan). It is remarkable that at the time of Siileyman, afetva was issued obliging 
every village to have a mosque and measures were taken to assure that everyone 
attended the Friday prayer. In other words, the state not only imposed, but also 
controlled the quality of religion. 
The sincerity of faith in Islam of most Ottoman were witnessed by two 
European visitors Postel and Du Loir in the 16th and 17th centuries: 
Whoever sees the modesty, the silence and the reverence that 
they have in their mescit or places of eration, should experience 
great shame in seeing that our churches do not serve anything 
but chatting, politicising and merchandising and that they are 
reduced to places ofthieves.(39) 
At marches of the army, during which it seems that 
everything is allowed, and when the exercise of war proclaims 
that of religion, the Turkish soldiers, marching through the 
deserts of sandy Arabia under great heat, fast, as rigorously as if 
they were in their calm and tranquil homes. ( ... ) Neither the 
condition of the persons, nor the length or the heat of the days, 
nor the fatigue of their work prevents them from abstinence 
(fasting) ... the rigour of their observance should make most of 
the Christians blush. ( 40) 
It appears that the combination of religious belief which had merged with 
ancient tribal and military discipline was what made the Ottoman armies so 
. . 1mpress1ve. 
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2. 3. THE RULING AND THE RELIGIOUS CORPS 
Having mentioned the merger of Islam and state in the Ottoman tradition, 
an analysis of what the differences and the similarities between the religious and the 
ruling corps were, is an extremely important one. Albert Lybyer gave a very acute 
analysis of the interaction between the religious and the secular corps: 
"It can be observed that the ideas coming from the Islamic tradition affected 
the Ottoman state tradition and thought, more than the Ottomans affected the other 
non-Turkish Islamic peoples within and outside their territories." ( 41) As a 
reflection of the concept of faith in Islam, both the ruling class and the ulama 
based their power and legitimacy on faith. The former was based on faith and 
loyalty to the state and the sultan, and the latter was based on faith to the religion. 
Therefore the question of loyalty of different ethnicities to the state among the 
Muslim peoples was solved through Islam. Especially of those recruited within the 
dev~irme system was made possible through faith in the state and the sultan. This 
was one of the reasons for the longevity of the Empire. Both the religious and the 
administrative corps promised equal opportunity to those who accepted the rules of 
the game. Furthermore, both the ulama and the sultan claimed universal expansion 
of the Ottoman State and justified it respectively through dogma and military 
might. Although the ulama recruited its members from among Muslims, and the 
administrative and the military corps , to a large extent from among non-Muslims, 
the sultan was the master of the secular institutions and the effective head of the 
religious one. For it was him who appointed the $eyhulislam. He was the head of 
the religious corps, appointed by God, and the master of the ruling and 
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administrative corps. From Mehmed II until the death of Siileyman, the main 
members of the religious corps were appointed by the sultan himself However, 
after Siileyman' s death, the ulama was left basically unattented and uninterfered by 
the sultans, and much less punished for any wrongdoing in comparison to the 
administrative and the military corps.(42) 
The differences between the two corps could be enumerated as follows: the 
members of the secular corps were mainly chosen from among non-Muslims, the 
members of the ulama were chosen from the Muslim subjects of the Empire. The 
first fact is indicative of a worry about assuring fidelity to the sultan, since converts 
from Christian families, uprooted from their native environments would render a 
higher degree of fidelity. Given that once they were uprooted from their native 
lands, the only source of benevolence, power and promotion that they had was the 
sultan. In the case of the ulama, Islam did not justify slavery, therefore the 
interpreters of religion could not be kuls (servants or slaves) in a direct sense.(43) 
Furthermore, the members of the ulama being of Muslim origin, assured also 
sincerity in the faith. Another difference between the two corpora is the fact that, 
while the ulama could oppose the sultan's ideas, the Grand Vizir could hardly or 
rarely do it. While the former always had the authority of religion behind him, the 
latter had nothing but sheer obligation to obey the sultan. However, on the basis of 
this analysis, it would be erroneous to conclude that an inter-elite conflict existed 
within the Ottoman state. Since both the religious and the ruling corps had the 
sultan as the ultimate source of obedience in a pyramidal structure, which 
contributed to the prevention of such an inter-elite conflict. 
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2. 4.STATE IDEOLOGY AND ISLAM 
When one looks at how Islamic ideals were used as a tool of legitimacy for 
political power in the Ottoman State, one sees a transformation from the early 
stages of the Empire into the 16th century. While at the beginning of the Empire in 
the 14th century, ideals and terms concerning political legitimacy had a more 
worldly connotation, starting from late 14th and early 15th centuries, the idea of 
jihad with the support of Islamic dogma, started gaining importance. 
Ahmedi( 1334-1412) was the first poet and moralist that legitimized the idea 
of gaza (holy war), saying that the Ottoman sultans were great gazis (holy 
warriors), whose mission was to sweep away polytheism on earth ( alluding to the 
fact that Christians considered Christ son of God ). In the words of a poet, 
A gazi is one who is God's carpet sweeper 
Who cleanses the earth of the filth of polytheism 
Do not imagine that one who is martyred in the path of God is 
dead 
No, that blessed martyr is alive 
From there they sent an army to the abode of infidelity 
to ravage the lands and slaughter infidels (44) 
The gazi state was the most celebrated ideal of legitimacy. The Ottomans 
were the protectors of the Islamic faith with their swords and it was an obligation 
upon every Muslim to conduct war on the infidels according to Sharia. The word 
akmc1 (raider, basically upon Christian lands) at the beginning of the Ottoman 
state, had a Turkic and non-religious connotation. Later in the 15th century, it was 
replaced by the word gazi ( from gaza, as holy war). Thus the profane was 
sanctified in the service of the state.(45) Accordingly, 
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An important feature of this image was its presentation of the 
sultans and their followers as gazi heroes. ( .... ) The ideology of 
holy war provided two justifications for Ottoman rule. Firstly, it 
portrayed the sultans as fulfilling a canonical obligation; 
secondly, it gave them a canonical right to rule the territories 
which they had conquerred from the infidels.( 46) 
By Suleyman the Magnificient' s time, The Ottomans reached the ideal of a 
universal caliphate and a universal empire. In 1557, the Seyhulislam Ebussuud 
Efendi, engraved the following inscription on the grand mosque of Si.ileyman: 
This slave of God, powerful with God's power and His mighty 
deputy on the earth, standing by the commands of the Quran 
and for the execution of them all over the world, master of all 
lands, and the shadow of God over all nations, Sultan over all 
the sultans in the lands of Arabs and Persians, the propagator of 
sultanic laws, the tenth sultan among the Ottoman Khakans, 
Sultan, son of Sultan, Sultan Suleyman Khan.(47) 
The title " Servitor of the Two Holy Sanctuaries" was used by the Ottoman 
sultans referring to Mecca and Medina, after slipping into a self-styled caliph status 
following the death of the last Fatimid caliph of Egypt, at the time of Yavuz Sultan 
Selim. Although the actual title "caliph" was hardly used by the Ottomans ( they 
made use of the above mentioned title instead ), they were always conscious of 
their role as the propagators of Islam. In fact, it was at the time of Sultan 
Abdulhamid II in the 19th century that the title "Caliph" was primarily used by an 
Ottoman sultan, as a tool of deterrence, bluffing to promote the so-called pan-
Islamism, to keep the Empire together in the face of heavy losses of territory that 
the Ottomans suffered in the 19th century. 
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2. 5. ORTHODOX AND HETERODOX ISLAM 
There always appeared heterodoxies in kingdoms or empires which 
adopted an official religion. Islam, at least in doctrine, is a religion that refutes any 
sort of intermediary between God and the individual. Although there should not 
have emerged a religious class in Islam, in practice, a kind of sacerdotium called 
ulama emerged in Islam. On this point, a few classifications have to be made: The 
sacerdotium in Christianity, and especially in Catholicism, is a necessary and an 
inseparable element of the relationship between God and the individual ( although 
the Protestants refute a sacerdotium, the ministers in Protestantism have played an 
important social, political and a cultural role ). Interestingly enough, as the 
historical role of sacerdotium in the western Church (particularly that of the 
Catholic Church) shows, there has been a dialectic action between sacerdotium 
versus regnum. This duality or the continual dialectic balancing the sacerdotium 
and the regnum, manifested itself in the form of sacerdotium protecting the rights 
of the Church or of the clergy against the rulers. This balance was achieved 
through conflict as well as debate in the Western Church.(48) Likewise, the ulama 
in the Ottoman Empire also appeared to be an indispensable element for the 
Muslims to perform their religion; or at least a strict necessity to understand the 
revelation brought by Mohammed. It is not that without the ulama an individual 
did not belong to Islam, rather it turned out that to live Islam as it should be lived, 
the individual needed the ulama's interpretations of the Koran and the Hadith. The 
most striking difference between the Ottoman ulama and the Western sacerdotium 
is that, the ulama never presented itself as an antagonistic or an alternative force to 
the regnum, in the Ottoman case to the sultan. 
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Where heterodoxy fits into the argument is that, it was the only asocial force 
in a religious dress which claimed there was no need of intermediation between 
the individual and God. If there were no intermediaries, the power of the ulama 
was at stake. Hence, so was the power of the state and the sultan, since the state 
derived its power to a great extent from religion. 
There were three kinds of heterodoxies in the Ottoman Empire: 
The first one was not a threat to the state authority. These were tariqas or various 
interpretations of sufi Islam which had been incorporated into the tolerance scale of 
the state. Tolerance was there either because the tariqa had followers from among 
the military class(i.e. the relationship between the Janissaries and the Be~i order) 
or because their doctrines did not clash with the official Sunni doctrine( i.e. the 
Mevlevi and the Nakshbandi tariqas). The second kind of heterodoxy presented 
itself in the form of tariqas, at least formally or strictly not belonging to a particular 
Sunni or Shiite doctrine( the Babais and the Abdal traditions), who had a more 
anarchic nature. The third class of tariqas were those with overt Shiite 
tendencies(i.e. the Alawis), which were perhaps the greatest threat to official 
authority, because they were perceived as representing the authority of the Shiite 
and rival Iran. 
Accoding to Fuat Koprillii, the most important tariqas belonging to the first 
category, at the time of the foundation of the Ottoman state were, the Mevlevi, the 
Halveti and the Rifai.(49) The Mevlevi tariqa which is named after Mevlana 
Celaleddin Rumi (1207-1273), was one of the most important and one of the most 
favoured tariqas by the official state authority. The sultans, at the beginning of the 
Empire, started their sultanate in a ceremony where a Shaikh belonging to the 
Mevlevi order girded them. The Mevlevi order which was made into an established 
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tariqa after the death of its founder Rumi, incorporated a large number of Muslims 
from all social classes, at the time when Rumi was alive. Moreover, it also had 
adherents from among the Jews and Christians of Anatolia due to its ecumenical 
nature. However, after it was turned into an established tariqa by Sultan Veled 
(Rumi' s son), soon after Rumi' s death, it gradually lost its ecumenical nature and 
turned into a Sunni tariqa. After Mevlana, making use of his grand fame, his 
followers opened various tekkes (tariqa houses) all over; gradually, the tariqa's 
ceremonial structure came into being. "This tariqa which depended on the high 
aristocracy and the high-middle bourgeoisie, has been against heterodoxy from its 
earlier times, and they tried to preserve the existing social and political order." (50) 
Also the Halveti and the Rifai tariqas were part of the Sunni scan. Generally, the 
Halveti tariqa appealed to the bourgeoisie, whereas the Rifais appealed to the poor 
stratum of the society. 
As to the second category of tariqas in the Empire, the Babais and the 
Bekta~is were the most important ones. The Babai tariqa which came into being at 
the first half of the 13th century around Tokat, Malatya and K.tr~ehir, was a 
synthesis of the Shamanic-Turkic-indegenous Anatolian religious beliefs, under the 
appearance ofislam.(51) The Babais, like the later Bekt~is, had followers from the 
rural classes of the society, where beliefs and practices were inspired by various 
indigenous Anatolian peoples, as well as by pre-Islamic Turkic traditions. Religious 
and political propaganda abounded in the lives of the Turkomans, some of whom 
also believed in a coming "messiah", the twelfth Imam, like the Shiites. Heterodoxy 
and political protest against the central authority was so much identified that the 
ulama in the rural regions could not cope with the shaikhs called "Baba", who 
derived their power from popular culture. (52) In fact, the Babai uprising of 1239-
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1240 against the Sel~uk State m south-east Anatolia reflects the degree of 
politicization of the Babais. 
The Babai tradition gave birth, later on, to the Bekta§i tariqa with its 
founder Hac1 Bek~ Veli (d. 1271). There is not a great difference in vision 
between the Babai and the Bekta§i tariqas, in fact, one can say that Bekta§ilik is a 
continuation of the Babai tradition. The Bekta§i tariqa incorporated various Babai 
orders as well as other smaller tariqas within itself The example of Osman Baba 
(53) is a representative example of how the Abdal tradition in heterodox Islam 
became a threat to Sunni Islam. Hence to the state authority. Considering that the 
Abdals were dervishes, usually completely independent and free from any dogma. 
Their tradition could be approximated to a mixture of Shamanistic and popular 
Islamic beliefs. 
The third category of heterodoxy, namely the Alawis, represented the Shiite 
Iran's third arm for the Ottomans. Although popular misconceptions in Turkey still 
consider them a Sunni heterodoxy, they are basically a branch of Shiite Islam. (54) 
However, they are definitely not orthodox Shiites who adhere to the Jaafarite 
school. Rather it is a combination of Shiism with Anatolian traditions. 
If we were to situate the Ottomans within a broader historical and 
philosophical context, the following observations could be made: Although the 
Ottomans created one of the greatest empires of the world, ideologically, 
religiously, and as far as the structure of the Empire is concerned, much was taken 
from non-Turkic sources. As far as the role of Sunni Islam is concerned, it 
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probably had the supreme expression of the idea of obedience and authority in the 
Ottoman Empire. In Persian Shiism, obedience to a corrupt state should not be 
there, whereas in Sunni Islam, the presence of an authority of state is preferable to 
chaos, as it is reflected in the relatively recent Nurcu tariqa. The manifestation of 
obedience in the Ottoman Empire - which may be considered as the key-word as it 
pertains to the spirit of the Empire - was perhaps the utmost realization of the spirit 
of Islam. Islam, as its historical evolution and its various manifestations show, is a 
religion based on surrendering one's ego and individuality to the supreme authority 
of God. We have seen how the authority of God and the sultan were identified. 
An aspect of Islam differing from Christianity, is the fact that the concept of 
renunciation in Islam - in its spirit - is not the renunciation of the material world, 
but rather, the renunciation of one's individuality. This very fact is seen clearly in 
the personalities of the founders of these religions. Christ was fundamentally a rebel 
and spiritually an outsider to the religion into which he was born. He brought a 
new message which essentially was against holding spirituality solely within the 
boundaries of Mosaic law. However the culmination of the new message that he 
brought to the world did not happen in Judea, but rather outside his homeland. In 
fact, he was handed over to be crucified by his own people. On the other hand, 
looking at the message that Mohammed brought, he could not be considered a 
rebel in the society into which he was born. He brought a new religion - however -
he did not try to eradicate the traditions of the society that he was born into, in fact 
there was a continuity in social terms. The greatest enemies of the new religion that 
Mohammed brought, after the establishment of the religion as a social and political 
entity, turned out to be - not the polytheists of Arabia - but rather various Judaist 
and Christian communities which stood in the way of expansion. Paradoxically 
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enough, the other brother monotheistic religions were a greater threat to Islam than 
polytheism. On the other hand, once Christianity spread outside Judea, the greatest 
enemy to fight was not another monotheistic religion - but rather paganism -
represented first by the Roman Empire, and then by the popular culture in 
Medieval times. 
As a consequence, it is not surprising that the Ottomans had to fight with 
different interpretations of the same God and even with different interpretations of 
the same religion, as the struggle against Islamic heterodoxies shows. However, 
what is more important of what comes out of this observation, is, the main 
difference between Christianity and Islam. While the former ended up representing 
rebellion at the social and spiritual levels, the latter represented conformism and 
obedience. The glorification of power, military might and authority over the 
individual, in the name of the semi-sacred state or ruler (i.e. religion), is a most 
striking social characteristic of Islam - for the accomplishment of which -
obedience is needed. This aspect of Islam is what the Ottomans made use of in the 
ablest way possible. 
As a result, authority, obedience and worldly power were the key aspects 
that Islam offered to the Ottoman Empire. One can claim controversially that the 
Ottoman rulers made use of religion in quite a systematic and calculated way to 
shape it according to their power-legitimacy needs. This is somewhat a neglected 
an issue, or dealt with marginally by Turkish historians, due to ideological or 
nationalistic concerns. It is also worth noting - quite paradoxically - that while the 
counter-effects of the Christian way of worldly renunciation began to produce 
results in the manifestation of Enlightenment, the counter-effects of the Islamic 
way of renunciation ( i.e. obedience to the worldly manifestation of divine 
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authority ) also resulted in losing power against the Christian world. The main 
reason for this was the failure to create alternative or counter-forces to the religion-
based authority. The dialectics of religious versus secular forces did not appear in 
the Ottoman Empire, for the religious and the secular merged in a structure, 
inseparable from each other. 
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CHAPTER3 
3. THE BYZANTINE AND THE TURCO-IRANIAN CULTURES IN 
OTTOMAN STATE TRADITION 
Every state needs two forces for longevity and strength. These are: a firm 
structure and a capacity to renew itself The structure of a state includes many 
components such as a stable administration, a state tradition and an ideology, and 
the necessary measures to enforce an order of loyalty. The Byzantine Empire had 
the first element, however, it lacked the second. Namely, like the Ottoman Empire, 
it lacked the capacity to develop alternative thought systems to renew itself 
Therefore, the first part of this chapter is dedicated to the continuity between the 
Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires in the realm of state tradition and the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses that the two empires had in common because of their 
ideologies. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the continuity between 
the inner -Asian Turkic state tradition, especially focusing on the idea of obedience 
to the leader or ruler, as it was found in the inner-Asian Turkic state such as the 
Kharahanids and afterwards in the Sel~uk states. 
It is most unfortunate that, there is a dearth of insightful and well-written 
academic work on the influence of these two different sources on the Ottomans, 
namely on the influence of the Byzantines and the inner-Asian Turks.The reason 
for the shortage of academic work written on the Byzantium-Ottoman relationship 
seems to stem from various reasons. The first reason is that the Ottomans 
themselves did not leave sufficient first-hand documents to come up with a direct 
continuity between the two states. Considering the trend of document-fetishism 
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involved with the study of the Ottomans, which tends to neglect non-official 
history which can sometimes be more truthful, the lack of first-hand data written by 
court-officials pointing at an inspiration taken from the Byzantines on state 
ideology, appears to be of prime importance. However, there is an even more 
important fact that is neglected as one thinks of the taken-for-granted-truths about 
Ottoman history. That is, the amount of ideology involved in academic writing. 
The Turkish historians, one must admit, have not approached this aspect of 
Ottoman history with a completely independent and inquisitive mind. 
There are basically two trends on the subject of continuity between 
Byzantium and the Ottoman empires among Turkish academics: one is that of 
rejecting any continuity between Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire, and the 
other is that of ignoring any continuity between the two, intentionally or 
unintentionally. The book of Fuad Kopruli.i written about the influence of 
Byzantine institutions on the Ottoman ones is an example of the first category. (1) 
The reason why Kopruli.i rejected any continuity between the two states must be 
found in the period the book was written (the 1930s), as a result of the nationalistic 
trend that was reigning in this period which is highlighted by re-writing Turkish 
history, tracing back the ideals of the foundations of the modern Turkish state to 
the Turkish or Turkic sources. It is precisely because of this reason that the 
influence of Turkic states of inner Asia on the Ottomans, as well as the modern 
Republic have been exaggerated in a romantic trend of re-writing history. 
The aim of this chapter is not to find the absolute truth about these subjects. 
Rather, the absolute truth ( if ever such a thing exists) can be found by being 
exposed to different points of view. Neither does this chapter claim to be an 
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exhaustive study of the above mentioned subjects, but rather an exploration into a 
much neglected area of Ottoman history. 
Among European historians, there is a variety of points of view concerning 
continuity between Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire. Steven Runciman says the 
following on the subject, in his book The Byzantine Civilization: 
The Empire of the Ottoman Sultans have often been called 
Byzantium, erroneously, for though both were Empires governed 
through the army, the Ottomans all along had nothing beside their 
magnificent military organization. Their bureaucracy was a farce. 
From Byzantium they borrowed little except the Capital. Even their 
theocratic autocracy was derived not from Constantine the 
Thirteenth Apostle but from the Califs oflslam. (2) 
In contrast, what Charles Diehl says on the same subject, in his book Byzantium. 
Greatness and Decline, is quite the opposite: 
When, by the capture of Constantinople, the Turks 
destroyed the Byzantine Empire, they inherited not only its 
territories and political power, but took pos~ession of much else in 
the realm that they seemed to have annihilated. 
Those rough warriors were neither administrators nor 
lawyers, and they understood little of political science. 
Consequently they modelled many of their state institutions and 
much of their administrative organization upon what they found in 
Byzantium. The pomp surrounding the Turkish sovereigns of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was as elaborate as the the old 
Byzantine ceremonial, and the Sultan ha8 been rightly called "a 
Muslim Basileus". The hierarchy of his officials, as instituted by 
Mohammed II in the Kanoun-Nameh , is curiously reminiscent of 
the Greek Empire. A Rambaud points out that the position of the 
two Beylerbegs of Anatolia and Roumelia was exactly that of the 
two Domestics of the Scholae of East and West, and that equal 
similarity existed between the Grand Domestic and the Grand 
Vizier, between the Megadux and the Capitan-pasha, and between 
the Grand Logothete and the Rais-effendi. Logothetes became 
Defterdars, while the Nishanji was the counterpart of the former 
imperial secretary ( Em -rov xav1xA£1ov ). There is every reason to 
believe that in the provinces the Ottoman sanjaks corresponded 
fairly exactly to the old Byzantine themes , while the Beg of the 
sanjak was the equivalent of the Logothete of the theme; and it 
would seem that in their administration the Ottomans preserved the 
framework bequeathed to them by the Empire. 
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We may wonder how much of the Turkish system of 
military fiefs was borrowed from Byzantium. Certainly the timars 
and the ziams , the fiefs of the spahis , were counterparts of the old 
domains. As Zachariae of Ligenthal so well said, "It would be quite 
erroneous to consider the official institutions in the Ottoman Empire 
as specifically Turkish in origin". There is no doubt that in the 
systems and the usages of Islam there survived far more of 
Byzantine tradition than is commonly believed. (3) 
As seen from the quotations above, Runciman and Diehl take completely 
opposing points of view about the influence of Byzantium on the Ottomans. It is 
far more likely that Diehl, s point of view reflects historical reality more accurately 
than that of Runciman's. For claiming that the Ottomans had nothing but their 
formidable military organization and that their bureaucracy was a farce is a claim 
that any knowledgeable historian on Ottoman history would refute. There is 
enough evidence that the Ottomans had developed quite an intricate state ideology 
and a bureaucracy. As to the ideas of Diehl, it is arguable whether the Ottomans 
(or Turks, as he calls them) were rough warriors who did not understand anything 
of political science and law. It seems like an exaggeration to call the people merely 
"rough warriors" who built and maintained an empire which lasted for six hundred 
years. However, there is an element of truth in asserting that the Ottomans became 
an empire in the real sense of the word, only after they conquered the Byzantine 
capital, by whose imperial glory and state structures they were "impressed", to say 
the least. Furthermore, to be elaborated on later, there exists an astonishing 
similarity between the «theocratic autocracy" of the Ottomans and that of 
Byzantium, contrary to Runciman's claims, which is especially visible in the 
relationship between religion and state in these two empires. 
Metin Kunt is one of the Turkish academics who acknowledges Byzantine 
influence on the Ottomans. (4) Kunt also argues that, although the Byzantine 
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influence on the Ottomans was refuted by Kopriilii, the Ottomans have 
incorporated many of the administration and taxation regulations not only of 
Byzantium but also of the former Bulgarian and Serbian lands as well as the other 
captured realms of Uzun Hasan of the Akkoyunlu Tiirkmen. (5) Mentioning K. 
Zhukov and N. Oikonomides respectively, Kunt also asserts that " affinities have 
also been detected between specific Byzantine provincial military groupings and 
similar troops in Ottoman as well as other Tiirkmen emirates of western Anatolia" 
( 6), and "furthermore, we now realize that the question is not just a one-sided 
Byzantine-on-Ottoman influence~ during the century and a half of coexistence 
Byzantium had itself adopted certain Ottoman features of administration". (7) 
Therefore, it is not surprising at all that the Ottomans have adopted ways and 
traditions from Byzantium, considering that the influence was not even one-sided. 
One of the most curious facts indicating the Ottoman aspiration, making the 
Ottoman Empire seem as being the continuity of Byzantium was: "As reflected in 
his titles, Mehmed the Conqueror regarded himself as a sultan in the Islamic 
tradition and a great khan in the Inner Asian mould as well as a 'kaisar' , ceasar, of 
the Romans or the Rumi, Byzantine and Turkish". (8) Here, once again, the 
Ottomans were the synthesis-makers of the "trinity" of Islam-Byzantium-Inner 
Asia, as it pertains to the origins of their political identity. 
Before embarking upon the similarities between Byzantium and the 
Ottoman Empire in political ideology and the tools of which they commonly made 
use, the common mission that these two empires shared in history should be 
mentioned. Lybyer says the following on this common mission: 
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( .... ) the great m1ss10n that was before the Ottomans was the 
mission of uniting. The lands that were united for eleven centuries 
under Theodosius the Great which were threatened by Slavic, Arab, 
Tatar and Turkish invasions; Byzantine, Persian, Muslim, the 
Crusades and Moghul wars .... (9) 
In other words, both the empires had the common mission of keeping people of 
diverse creeds, ethnicities and religions together. The important thing to be 
recognized here is that both the empires ruled over more or less the same lands and 
people. Therefore the methods to keep a great empire together for both the states 
did not vary much; in fact it could not vary much. Following is an account of the 
similarities of methods and ideas that Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire had in 
common. 
3. 1. THE USE OF RELIGION 
The Byzantine emperor, as a continuity from the Roman tradition, was not 
only the Jmperaior , but also the commander in chief and the most important of all 
the Legislator. " It was in his name that the generals won victories; it was his 
sovereign and infallible will that made the law, of which he was the living 
expression."(10) Furthermore, the Emperor was "the chosen of God, the Anointed 
of the Lord, the vicar of God on earth, His lieutenant at the head of armies, and as 
they said in Byzantium, isapostolos : prince equal to the apostles." ( 11) In the 
Ottoman Empire, the sultan was also the head of the army, the supreme political 
power and the supreme legislator. The coexistence of sultanic law vis a vis the 
Sharia in the Ottoman Empire was a fact. The Ottoman sultans used the title 
zillullah fl 'l ardh ( the shadow of God on earth). The wars in Byzantium were 
conducted with the divine decree and the authority that God gave to the emperor 
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to spread the faith against the infidels; as it was in the Ottoman Empire, the sultan 
was not only the protector and the messenger of the Islamic faith, but also the 
greatest succesor of the true Islamic faith after the four caliphs, successors of 
Mohammed. The rest of the Muslim rulers were either heretics or corrupt 
according to the Ottomans, just as according to the Orthodox the real carriers of 
the Christian faith was Byzantium. Hence the rivalry between the Orthodox Church 
and Rome. 
There were two ways that Byzantium could hold the Empire together: one 
was the use of the Hellenic culture and the second was unity through orthodoxy. 
The Hellenic culture meant the adoption of Greek language as the lingua franca, 
and as the official language of the Empire no matter how many nationalities and 
religions lived in the Empire; it also meant the adoption of the Greek way of 
thought, behaviour and customs. The Byzantine Empire was a Christian orthodox 
empire, orthodoxy being one of its fundamental cornerstones, just like Sunni 
orthodox Islam was for the Ottoman Empire. Similar to the Ottoman case, the 
official religion of the Empire-Orthodoxy- was encouraged and life became more 
difficult for the ones who did not belong to the faith. Any citizen of the Byzantine 
Empire, to whichever ethnicity he belonged, could rise within the ladder of civil 
service of the Empire and reach the highest positions as generals, ministers, court 
functionaries as well as climb to prestigious places in the provincial administration. 
There were Arabs, and even some Turks who converted to Orthodoxy and became 
ministers of the imperial court. The Orthodox faith was the force keeping the 
Empire together. Although the official policy was to let people practice their own 
faith, in a fairly tolerant fashion, there have been examples of brutal religious 
persecutions in the case of the Paulicians in the ninth century ( a heretic sect that 
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originated in today's Sivas in Anatolia, which did not recognize the authority of the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople. They were sent to exile in Bulgaria and gave rise to 
the Bogomil sect). Other examples of religious persecution are the Armenians in the 
eleventh and the Bogomils in the twelfth centuries.(12) The uniting role of 
Orthodoxy for Byzantium can be seen in the following passage: 
Their missionaries evangelized and converted the Slavs of 
Macedonia and the Peloponnesus, the Turks of the Vardar, the 
pagan Mainotes, and the Arabs of Crete and the upper Euphrates. 
From the depths of Anatolia to the tip of Italy, numerous dioceses 
of the Greek rite were set up, whose bishops, under the authority of 
the Patriarch of Constantinople, were the finest and most faithful 
workers in the dissemination of Orthodoxy. (13) 
To be able to understand the place of religion in Byzantium, one must 
understand the unimportance of life in this world for the Byzantine citizen. The 
real achievement and happiness, for the Byzantine, came in "the other world" and 
the only way to achieve that was to follow Orthodoxy. Christianity triumphed 
because of people's disillusionment to find bliss and contentment in this world 
here and now. Therefore all the energies and attention in the religious sense were 
dedicated towards the end of achieving eternal life. It was not that Byzantium did 
not care about the worldly worries of power, money or survival, but, the 
theological issues of detail were of immense importance to the rulers as well as the 
clergy.(14) 
The worldly instincts of comfort and self-advancement could never, 
it is true, be suppressed; and financial worries, the burden of over-
taxation, always could arouse strong if negative feelings. But the 
main attention of the Byzantine was very reasonably concentrated 
on those little details that would open or close to him the gates of 
heaven. ( 15) 
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In such an important area as religion, certainly the role of the religious 
authority had to match that of the Empire. The Patriarch of Constantinople was 
raised to the second position among other patriarchs after Rome, surpassing the 
patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem by the Second Ecumenical 
Council in the second half of the fourth century, while before that Byzantium 
(Constantinople) was a bishopric. In the sixth century, the position of the Patriarch 
of Constantinople was made even more important by raising his position equal to 
that of the Pope, by taking the title the Ecumenical Patriarch in the Council of 
Chalcedon. After the seventh century, the Patriarch of Constantinople became the 
unquestioned head of Eastern Christendom and thanks to the unity of force 
between state and religion, it became the de facto most powerful religious 
institution in the whole of Christendom. However "the Patriarch paid for his 
authority. He was never long allowed to forget that he was the servant of the 
Emperor." (16) In fact, the difference between the Pope and the Patriarch was that, 
although the Pope was independent he lacked effective political power, whereas 
the Patriarch of Constantinople was subordinate to the Emperor, but he had. the 
real political power. The Patriarch of Constantinople remained the religious head 
of the greatest unified state of whole Christendom. 
On the other hand, the two empires were inspired by different religions. One 
of the greatest differences between the Ottoman Empire and Byzantium in the 
religious sense was the fact that although the Ottomans adopted the relationship of 
state merging with religious power, as it was in the Byzantine state tradition, 
Byzantium was essentially an Empire formed and inspired by the ideals of 
Christianity, whereas the Ottoman Empire was essentially inspired by the ideals of 
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Islam. This difference can easily be seen by the role and place that monasticism 
played in Byzantium - an institution non-existent in Islam - although the tariqas in 
the Ottoman Empire played a similar role of limiting the state authority. The 
difference was that the tariqas were not a part of mainstream Islam whereas the 
monasteries were an integral part especially of, Orthodox Christianity. In fact the 
Iconoclasm movement of the eighth century was basically a movement undertaken 
by the state authority to control and suppress the power of the monasteries. 
Iconoclasm was apparently a theological dispute centered on the veneration of the 
images of Christ. The question was whether the images of Christ or of God could 
be venerated or not. Although it was centered on this Christological question, the 
main issue was to put down the excessive political power that the monasteries had 
gained. Therefore it may be argued, concerning the comparison between the 
monasticism and the tariqas, that the merging of state authority with religion in the 
Ottoman Empire was even stronger. For such an institution like monasticism was 
never a part of the officially recognized Islam in the Ottoman Empire. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that many Emperors in various stages of 
Byzantine history abdicated to become monks in later life. 
Apart from these considerations, the similarity of the position of Seyhiilislam 
to the Patriarch of Constantinople is worth noting. Just as the Seyhiilislam was the 
official responsible for every mosque and religious institution in the Empire, the 
Patriarch of Constantinople was kept informed about every church and monastery 
in Byzantium. The whole of religious institutions were controlled strictly from 
Constantinople. Another striking similarity is the position of the Seyhiilislam vis a 
vis the sultan. The Seyhiilislam was theoretically independent of the sultan, as the 
head of the religious institution, being chosen from among the ulama. In practice, 
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at least until the seventeenth century, he was never chosen without the consent of 
the sultan, as he was subordinated to the will of the sultan. The situation of the 
Patriarch of Constantinople showed great similarity. Formally the Patriarch was 
elected by the body of bishops. In practice, the Patriarch was nominated by the 
Emperor and his office could be terminated by the Emperor. The only tool of 
threat that the Patriarch had against the Emperor was excommunication. Similarly, 
the Seyhulislam could always use the power of Sharia against the sultan. Although 
the sultan had to abide by the Sharia, his de facto orfi power was above the Sharia. 
After the conquest of Constantinople, the importance of the Patriarchate was 
duly understood by the Ottomans and it was used as a means of political power to 
keep most of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire under unity and 
control. The continuation of the Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire under direct 
subordination to the Sublime Porte is not a coincidence. In fact, the Patriarchate in 
Constantinople was perceived in the nineteenth century by those countries which 
gained independence from the Ottomans, as a tool of imperialism. One of their first 
actions was to break with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and recognize their own 
national churches as the religious authority. The case of Serbia and Greece in the 
nineteenth century are examples. 
Another example of the similarity between the Patriarchate and the 
Seyhulislamllk is the elevation of the muftu of istanbul to the position of 
Seyhiilislam by Mehmed the Conqueror and the consolidation of the institution of 
Seyhillislamhk at the time of Siileyman the Magnificient. It is highly reminiscent of 
the elevation of the Bishop of Byzantium to the Patriarch of Constantinople and 
the consolidation of this position by the time of Theodosius I. As Runciman says: 
"The Byzantine Church was indeed an admirable State Church." (17) 
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3. 2. THE CONCEPT OF EMPEROR AND EMPIRE 
Similarity of the relationship between state and religion as well as the 
position of the Emperor and the sultan, in the Ottoman Empire and Byzantium, 
will be clearer by a few examples from Byzantine writers. The first example is from 
Institutio Regia (TiatOEta BacrtAtKE:Paideia Basilike), written at the beginning of 
the eleventh century. It is written by the archbishop of Bulgaria, Theophylaktos 
Euboka, in the form of mirror for princes, dedicated to Emperor Michael VII 
(1071-1078): "A real ruler, as the foundation of a church or a house, makes 
religion the comer-stone to himself He gives so much importance to religion that, 
he does not give the upper hand even to the clergy, since he speaks and acts 
knowing that God sees and hears everything." (18) The second example is from 
Theodoros Balsamon, the Patriarch of Antioch, who was also an authoritative 
canon-writer. ( Canons were laws of the Orthodox Church from where the word 
kanun, representing sultanic law in Ottoman is derived ): 
The service of the emperors ( autocrators) consists of enforcing and 
enlightening both the soul and the body, whereas the honour of the 
patriarchs is limited to the well-being of the soul and only this (since 
the well-being of the body does not concern them); likewise, the 
mercy and the concern of the Empress on the subjects also concerns 
the well-being of the body and only this (since women lack the 
power of spiritual help). Therefore the lights of the emperors (that 
is, the torches carried before them) are ornamented with double 
golden crowns; that of the patriarchs and empresses with a single 
crown( .... ) (19) 
The same tradition of sanctifying the sultans in a semi-divine fashion is also present 
in the Ottoman Empire, particularly after they became heirs to the Imperial City. 
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" 'Nothing must be done in the Church that is contrary to the will and commands 
of the Emperor' said one sixth century patriarch." (20) The absolute ruler in the 
state was the Emperor, the Autokrator, the Patriarch was elected by his 
recommendation and was either deposed or forced to abdicate if he failed to obey 
the Emperor. The Emperor could go as far as presiding at the ecclesiastical 
councils, guiding debates, formulating articles of faith, confirming and 
implementing canons adopted in the council, charging (and punishing) those 
opposing them with the charge of being the enemies of faith and God. (21) "High 
rank was no safeguard; dismissal, imprisonment, exile, and corporal punishment 
were the customary means of dealing with ecclesiastics; not even Popes escaped his 
violence and tyranny." (22) 
The power and authority of the Emperor in Byzantium was absolute, 
infallible and unquestioned, and claimed universality beyond the realms of the 
Empire. In Byzantine court tradition, when a foreign ambassador was invited to the 
palace and given a letter to take back to his king or ruler, the expression used by 
the Emperor to address the Persian or Muslim rulers was "my brother", whereas 
for the Christian rulers, it was "my son". This shows, as it was in the Ottoman 
tradition, the claim to universality over the rest of the rulers that belonged to the 
same religion. 
The tradition of the Senate and the representation of the will of the people 
which was inherited from Republican Rome, and could also be traced back to the 
Greek antiquity, was gradually replaced by a more oriental concept of sovereignty. 
In Byzantium, there was gradually no force which would balance the power of the 
Emperor. The Senate was gradually reduced to a state council consisting of 
officials united in devotion to their Emperor and the senatorial nobility served as an 
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assembly out of which the Emperor could choose the most able administrators. 
(23) "The people were a mob to be fed and amused, an unruly factious mob which, 
despite the efforts to tame it, sometimes broke out in rioting and bloody 
revolution." (24) Although the Church made some attempts of limiting the 
Emperor's authority, once in the ninth century, in demanding its freedom from 
secular power, overall, the attempt failed. However, the Church managed to 
compel the Emperor to take an oath at his coronation, to promise to respect the 
decrees of the seven ecumenical councils and not to interfere with ecclesiastical 
priviledge. (25) 
The majority of the Emperors of the Romans ( ... ) whereas they 
ought to punish the ignorant and the bold who introduce new 
dogmas into the Church, or else commit them whose function is to 
know God and speak of Him, they esteem themselves even in this 
sphere inferior to none, and set themselves up as interpreters, 
judges and definers of dogma, often punishing those who disagree 
with them. (26) 
One disadvantage of this absolute power of the Emperor was the fact that, 
this power could be balanced either by the military aristocracy and depositions of 
the Emperors by coups, or by revolts and uprisings. The depositions and revolts 
against the Emperor were facilitated by the fact that until the end of the ninth 
century Byzantium did not have a hereditary royal family. The ascendance to the 
throne was either through the Senate, the army or by decree of the Emperor, 
appointing an heir in his lifetime, as it had been the practice in the Roman Empire. 
It was only after the ninth century that the tradition of a royal family was 
established, with different dynasties following each other, such as the Macedonian, 
the Comneni and the Palaeologi. An established royal family and continuity in 
blood-line, made it more difficult to dethrone an emperor by military coups. 
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The "orientalization" of the Empire as it pertains to the concept of 
sovereignty, also helped stability and longevity. It must be remembered that this 
was an Empire which lasted from the fourth century up until well into the midst of 
the fifteenth century; and the political traditions that they adopted from the lands 
that they conquered made Byzantium move towards a more "oriental" concept of 
empire, away from the ancient Greek or Roman traditions. To be able to 
understand this transformation in Byzantium, the gradually decreasing role of the 
Senate and the political will of the people is a fundamental fact. 
The role of the Senate in Byzantium was not quite like that of the 
role of the Senate in the Roman Empire. In Byzantium, the Senate 
of Constantinople consisted of all present and past holders of offices 
and rank above a certain level and their descendants. It was thus a 
vast amorphous body comprising everyone of prominence, of 
wealth and of a responsible position in the Empire. (27) 
In 359 AD the Senate was given the priviledge of becoming an elector body, but its 
existence and name in Byzantium was somewhat less prestigious than it was in 
Rome. (28) Its powers were largely undefined, but it gave certain priviledges to its 
members who represented the wealthier classes of the society. The senate's power 
declined by the seventh century due to the tyranny of Emperors like Justinian II, 
and even Leo the !saurian who represented the triumph of aristocracy, could not 
tolerate the Senate when it interfered in his business. The Senate was finally 
abolished by Leo VI and "lingered as a body whom the Emperor could call as a 
respectable witness of his actions." (29) 
Another institution that could restrict the Emperor's authority were the 
demes or groups into which the people of Constantinople had organized 
themselves. They were organized into divisions like the Blue, Green, Red and 
White. They were in a way, an expression of the will of the people in the form of 
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political parties. They became an important political force , especially at the end of 
the fifth and the beginning of the sixth centuries, even threatening the power of the 
Emperor. (30) However, their power faded away in the seventh century together 
with that of the Senate, due to the growing power of the Emperor, and even when 
they were strong, the Emperor could always play one party against each other. 
After the seventh century, they became a mere representational and ceremonial 
element of the imperial games at the Hippodrome. 
Concerning manipulation of power according to ideology, the Byzantine 
Empire did not only make use of its Roman heritage. Quite the contrary, it had a 
transformation throughout its history, in the usage of political ideas from different 
cultures. The transformation of the Empire into an oriental autocracy is an example 
of this. 
W. H. Haussig, in his book The History of the Byzantine Civilization, points 
out to different political ideologies, stemming from different cultures that 
Byzantium made use of in its legitimization process. (31) Haussig says that at the 
apex of the imperial cult that Byzantium inherited from the Roman Empire, stood 
the cult of the Emperor. The imperial elevation of the Emperor to the throne was a 
direct inheritance from the Roman times, which represented quite a military spirit 
in its character, rather than a religious one. 
The military elevation to the throne was at first exclusive concern of 
the army. The soldiers raised their victorious military leader on the 
shield. He was then granted the triumph, and as triumphator he 
recieved the corona aurea , the crown of the triumphator, ( ... ) this 
crown which became the symbol of imperial authority. (32) 
Later this crown, the corona aurea, was replaced at the time of Heraclius in the 
seventh century, by the massive golden crown which is reminiscent of the crowns 
57 
that the Persian kings wore. "The Persian kings wore a crown of this kind. The 
kings of Kushana in Northern India and Afghanistan were portrayed with it, as 
were the later Byzantine Emperors." (33) The difference of the concept of 
Emperor in Persia was that, they were believed to be crowned by God and not by 
the army. In fact, not coincidentally, the change of the court tradition in Byzantium 
in this respect, appeared with the Heraclian Dynasty ( 610-711 ), whose origins are 
traced back to the Armenian branch of the Persian Arsacids. So there was a shift 
from the fourth to the seventh century, with a change of conception in the court 
tradition, which in tum, reflects the change in political ideology. This may be 
considered as an oriental or a foreign influence in Byzantium, from Roman to 
Oriental autocracy, as far as political ideology is concerned. It was no longer the 
army which was the supreme power, rather, the Emperor. 
It is also interesting to note that the Byzantine Emperors appear as being 
crowned by Christ in the iconography only after the Heraclian Dynasty, through 
the tenth and the eleventh centuries. The Byzantines did not immediately follow 
the Persian model of an emperor. In Persia, the Sassanid kings received the royal 
insignia from the highest religious authority, the chief Mobedh. The religious 
element in the Byzantine Empire was fully introduced in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries and the combination of Christianity and the power of the Emperor helped 
the legitimize the notion that the Emperor was crowned by Christ, and in return, 
he crowned the kings in his realm. Thus, the Oriental concept of the divine 
authority of the Emperor reached its climax. 
Another fact that was significant in witnessing the transformation of 
Byzantium into an oriental autocracy was that, at the beginning, the army had a 
role of real importance in the decision of who was to become Emperor. Later, as 
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the idea of a royal stock, or a royal family became more firmly established, the 
designation of an heir by the Emperor became the most important factor. The idea 
of a continuous royal family was owed to the East, which was distinctly different 
from the Roman concept of a royal stock, as this tradition was well-established in 
Armenia and the Caucasian lands ( i.e. the lands through which the Empire 
extended over to the East). It is, therefore, no coincidence that the orientalization 
of the Empire coincides with the ascendance to the throne of Heraclius I, of 
Armenian origin, who traced his origins back to the old Armenian and Parthian 
royal dynasties.(34) 
Other ceremony such as the Receiving of ambassadors originated in Iranian-
Hellenistic soil. (35) Some others, such as the representation of the demes at the 
Hippodrome games, which was of Roman origin, turned into symbolic acts of the 
representation of the will of the people. Another custom, the blessing of the 
vineyards on the 15th August by the Emperor also had Roman ongms, 
representing the semi-divine character of the Emperor. However, this ceremony 
was Christianized , being performed together with the Patriarch, instead of the 
high-priest of the pagan Roman religion. 
From a comparative perspective, there is a very significant similarity between 
the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires in the way they made use of foreign 
political ideas and in the way they made use of religion as a tool for legitimacy. The 
Byzantine Empire came originally from the Roman political culture and starting 
from the Heraclian dynasty in the seventh century, incorporated in the Empire an 
oriental vision of the absolutist concept of ruling, as was seen in the transformation 
of the court traditions and the decreasing importance of the Senate and the demes. 
It was at the beginning, also a pagan empire pertaining to its population and even 
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to the background of its ruling class; although Christianity was adopted as the state 
religion by Constantine the Great in the fourth century, the christianization of the 
Empire did not happen immediately. As the Roman character of the Empire 
gradually left its place to an oriental absolutist autocracy, the initial moderate 
Christian character of it also left its place to the identification of the Empire with 
Christian Orthodoxy. 
The dynamics were similar in the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning, the 
Ottomans had a more tribal character that they had brought from their Turkic 
tradition and they gradually turned into an empire, adopting the imperial traditions 
of Byzantium, which the Byzantines had in common or rather adopted from 
Iranian and Eastern traditions. Similarly, the moderate Muslim character of the 
founders of the Ottoman State was replaced by an orthodox concept of Islam, as it 
later became the state ideology. 
Another similarity is that, both states made use of religion until they gained a 
genuine imperial character strong enough to consolidate their power. After this 
stage the power of religion that was used as a means for legitimacy, at times 
threatened the authority of the very state or the sultan/emperor. An example of this 
in Byzantium is the immense power that the monasteries gained in the eighth 
century and the iconoclastic movement directed against them by the secular power. 
Similarly, once the power and the absolutist nature of the Ottoman Empire was 
consolidated, Sharia became the means through which the old Turkish nobility 
fought the authority of the sultan. Likewise, the double-edged sword of Sharia 
became the symbol of resistance against the will of the sultan as well as any 
innovation after the Ottoman Empire lost its dynamism. 
At the time of the original Oguz erruption, the Seljukids used 
Islamic ideology, of which the 'Iranian service aristocracy' were the 
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carriers, to raise themselves far above their tribal followers as Near 
Eastern autocrats in the traditional Byzantine or Sassanid mould 
( ... ) On the other hand, throughout the fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries, the great centralizers of the Ottoman Dynasty such as 
Bayezid I 'the thunderbolt' (1381402), Mehmed II 'the conqueror' 
(1451-81), Selim I 'the grim' (1512-20) all relied on the so called 
customary (or.ft) or customary-sultanic ( orfi-sultani) law to cut the 
ground from under the founding aristocracy of the state and the 
empire, whereas for its part that the old Turkish nobility tuned to 
the Sharia precisely because it provided a bulwark against the 
cosmopolitinization of court culture in the hands of Bayezid's 
Christian advisors, against the rise of dev~irmes ( the natally 
deracinated slaves of the Porte), or against the conversion of the 
hereditary patrimonies into land for conditional distribution as 
service fiefs( ... ) Here, then, religious law played the role of a brake 
on absolutist centralization, as evidenced by the Islamic reaction 
under Bayezid II (1481-1512). It was possible therefore, for the 
same belief system in two different historical settings to shoulder 
quite opposite functions and lead to varying outcomes. (36) 
Therefore it may be deduced that firstly, when the power of religion turned 
against them, both the Ottomans and the Byzantines made use of their sultanic or 
imperial decrees. Second, the important thing in both the empires was the absolute 
power of the ruler and using different means of legitimacy, varying at different 
historical settings. As Barker quite accurately observes: 
"In the East people have never tormented themselves to create 
political theories ... whereas the West is fertile with them". There has 
been opposition to these words saying: "Byzantine literature is 
soaked with political theories ... with theories of absolutism, the only 
possible regime for the Eastern Roman". There is an element of 
truth both in the assertion and in the answer given to it. (3 7) 
Such were the traces of continuity from Byzantium to the Ottoman Empire 
and the similarity of methods that these two empires adopted for the enforcement 
of their imperial structure pertaining to political ideas of foreign origin. 
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3. 3. THE TURKIC AND THE PERSIAN HERITAGE 
The use of orfi law or the power of the sultan to use his personal oikonomia 
against opposing forces, brings us to search for the genealogy of the or/ or tore 
institution in the Turkic state tradition. As inalctk explains in his article "Turkish 
and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in Kutadgu Bilig" (38), there were 
various political traditions that the Ottomans adopted from Iranian sources as well 
as others that they kept from their Turkic ancestors (as the Karakhanids adopted 
Uyghur traditions), which can be traced back to the Inner Asian state traditions. 
The significance of this article is that, it points out to a synthesis of Turkish and 
Iranian state traditions in the Karakhanid state. The relevance of it to the Ottoman 
state is that, this synthesis that existed in the Karakhanid state, to a large extent, 
also continued in the Ottoman state. 
As to the political theories of Iranian ongm, the absolute and the 
unquestioned power of the sultan seems to be the most significant concept. It is 
true that in the Iranian state tradition the concept of justice which was the 
foundation of the state, protected the subjects from the oppression and the injustice 
of the administrators (at least in theory). However, the absolute power of the ruler 
in the Iranian model - which can be traced back to the political theories of Indian 
origin, as seen in the Panchatantra of Kautilya , written in the Mauryan Empire of 
India, as a mirror for princes (written about 200BC- 500AD) - did not really have 
any other institution or force that could balance the absolute power of the ruler in 
the Indo-Persian state tradition. The only hope as reflected in the "mirror for 
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princes tradition" of the Indo-Persian culture - for protecting the subjects against 
unjust rule - was to rely upon the benevolence and sense of justice of the ruler. 
Institutions such as the Divan , where anyone could come at certain days and make 
complaints to the ruler about any injustice done by the administrators or even by 
the ruler himself, seems to be an institution, created for the purpose of balancing 
the absolute authority of the ruler. This institution was carried on by the Ottomans 
under the name of Divan-1 Hiimayun. The idea of such a Divan is also encountered 
in the Siyasatname ofNizamu'l Mulk, the Sel~uk Grand Vizier, and the idea was 
carried on to the Ottomans through the Anatolian Sel~uks. 
The idea of the "circle of justice" which is also found in the Iranian tradition 
is carried on to the Karakhanid advise literature, whose reflections we can see in 
the Ottoman state tradition as well. Kutadgu Bilig says: 
To preserve the state, a large army and many soldiers are needed; to 
feed the army there is need for great riches and wealth; in order to 
obtain this wealth the people must be prosperous, for the people to 
prosper just laws must be set forth. If any of these is neglected, all 
four will cease, and if all four are neglected , the kingdom will begin 
to come apart as seams.(39) 
However, there is a significant difference in the concept of the application of 
justice as it is found in the Indo-Iranian and Turkic traditions. 
Paramount in the Iranian state tradition was the absolute authority 
of the ruler. Indeed this authority was above the law; it was limited 
only by the concept of justice. We have seen that in most of the 
pandnames justice was pursued as a pragmatic objective, the profit 
of which was constantly alluded to ( the absence of justice breeds 
unrest and conflict, impoverishes the people, and dries up the 
sources of the ruler's treasury.) The execution of justice was the 
unique prerogative of the ruler; objective traditions limiting his 
absolute authority never developed. Justice manifested itself as the 
favor and benevolence of the ruler in the great divan. The 
pandname writers could find no other means of guaranteeing justice 
than to rely on such ethical principles as the rulers sense of justice 
and possession of moderation and gentleness. ( 40) 
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Whereas in the Turkic tradition, the torii or law is inseparable from 
sovereignty of divine origin. In other words, the ruler is not above the law but is 
subject to it. Furthermore, the ruler has duties towards his subjects, as he is bound 
by the customary law. One of the main duties of the Khan is to fill the bellies of the 
subjects and to prosper them. The continuation of this tradition is accounted for by 
Ibn-Batuta in the Kastamonu region in the 1330s where food is given to people by 
the sultan who opened his doors to everyone. Another account of this custom is by 
~1k P~ade at the Ottoman palace where food is given to people after the 
afternoon prayer. ( 41) 
We can trace back the importance of tribal customary law ( torii) to the 
Koktilrk state as the passage from the Orkun scriptures says: "Except God above 
does not collapse, except earth below does not give away, who can destroy your El 
(state) and torii". (42) 
It is no coincidence that notable Turkish sovereigns who founded 
states were promulgators of law codes (kanunname). According to 
the early Ottoman chroniclers, who. strongly reflect old Turkish 
traditions, after he had declared his independence Osman Gazi 
established laws. Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror ( 14 51 -81 ), the true 
founder of the Ottoman Empire, promulgated two law codes, one 
for the subjects and one concerning state administration. Finally, 
Siileyman the Law Giver (1520-66), who made the Ottoman state a 
world empire, also published a law code. These codes were a 
collection of laws relying solely from imperial decrees and had 
nothing to do with the Sharia; in other words they can thus be 
considered a result of Turkish state tradition. (43) 
Another similarity between the Turkic state formation and parallel concepts 
between the Mongolian and Ottoman Empires have been acknowledged by 
isenbike Togan in her article "Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms" (44) The 
conclusion that can be drawn from Togan's article in relation to the Ottomans is 
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that, the Ottomans possessed flexibility between the redistributive (tribal) 
traditions and the accumulative (imperial) ones. The redistributive forces were 
those inherited from the tribal inner Asian Turkic states which depended on 
sharing power. This can be seen at the initial period of the Ottoman state where 
the alliances between the various tribal begs in Anatolia were made use of, for the 
consolidation of the Ottoman state. The imperial or the accumulative traditions 
entered into the scene once the state gradually became an empire. The origins of 
the accumulative forces can be traced back to Indo-Iranian and Byzantine state 
tradition. 
According to Togan: "( ... )because the state was able to accommodate both 
accumulative and redistributive tendencies, it was flexible. Or, maybe it was able to 
accommodate the two modes because of its flexibility" ( 45) It seems that both the 
statements have an element of truth. According to Talat Halman, the most striking 
characteristic of all the Turkic states ( extending his assertion especially to the 
Ottomans) is the capacity of flexibility and a rapid talent for adaptation and an 
openness to incorporate foreign modes of thought and traditions. Halman claims 
that this fact is owed to the nomadic nature of the Turks, that they somehow, 
never lost. ( 46) 
The main idea and the overall picture in this chapter is the fact that, the 
central force to an Eastern empire is the unity of the state and the identification of 
its subjects to the state or to the sovereign by ties ofloyalty. 
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The purpose in this chapter has not been to prove what amount of political 
ideology the Ottomans received from which source. Neither has it been to prove 
the superiority in quality or quantity of any political idea over one or the other, 
pertaining to the degree of importance; be it of Islamic, Byzantine, Turkic or 
Persian origin. Rather, the purpose has been to find the genealogy of the political 
ideas that the Ottomans made use of, and perhaps more important than that, the 
purpose has been to give an example of the common characteristics of the oriental 
concept of an empire, including the concept of sovereignty and the means of 
power legitimization of power of the sovereign. 
One common characteristic that may be found in the empires of the Middle 
East, bearing a theocratic-autocratical structure is, although loyalty to the state and 
the sovereign was the central idea, the means to achieve it on an ideological basis, 
varied in time and in diverse historical settings. In the modem nation-state, the 
unity of the state is closely related to a more rigid and seemingly unchangeable 
ideology such as democracy, stemming basically from an idea of Western origin. 
On the other hand in the East - of whose member the Ottomans were - a less rigid 
concept of ever-changing and shifting ideologies were put to use at varying 
historical settings, till the very end of the Empire, when the Western state model 
seemed unchangeably firmly established. In the Ottoman Empire, it did not matter 
whether the uniting and the legitimizing ideology as inherited, taken over or 
adopted from a Turkic, Byzantine, Islamic or a Persian source. The important thing 
was that it served its purpose of creating a union. Similarly, so was the case with 
the Eastern Romans. As long as the unity of the Empire was not at stake, it did not 
matter whether the uniting ideology was of Roman, Persian or Christian origin. 
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It is not the duty of researchers, therefore, to make retrospective value-
judgements - as they are often made - by Western as well as Eastern scholars, on 
the virtues and the vices of a certain political ideology or regime, be it the Western 
or the Eastern model. On the other hand, there is something that can be done by 
the study of the two greatest empires of the Middle East. Firstly, to appreciate the 
unsurpassed margin of tolerance and the capacity of co-existence with different 
creeds, religions and ethnicities in the continuum that existed from the fourth until 
the twentieth century, in a period of a thousand and seven hundred years, in the 
part of the world that we call the Middle East today. This assertion does not - in a 
romantic way - ignore the numerous wars, intolerances and conflicts that happened 
among these different religious and ethnic groups. However, if comparison is made 
of a qualitative as well as a quantitative nature between the nation-state era and 
what preceeded it, it may be seen that the conflict and intolerance of what 
succeeded the Eastern empires on a Western model, surpasses its precedent far 
beyond. The second fact that can be understood by the study of the Eastern 
empires is the continuity in the state ideology of modem Turkey ( not discounting 
the discontinuities ) from the Ottoman Empire, whose origins can be traced back 
to the Eastern Roman Empire as well as the other sources such as the Persian or 
the Turkic model that the Ottomans took as examples. 
The subject of the fourth chapter is this continuity and mentioning the 
elements of discontinuity from the Ottoman Empire, m the state ideology of 
modern Turkey. 
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CHAPTER4 
4. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF OTTOMAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN 
TURKEY 
The previous chapters emphasized how the Ottoman Empire inherited and 
put into practice, various political models stemming apparently from diverse 
cultures such as the Iranian and Arabic Islamic, the Byzantine or the Eastern 
Roman, Persian and the Inner Asian. The political identity of the Ottoman Empire, 
therefore, was not the sum, or a bricolage of these diverse cultural forces, neither 
was it a monolithic entity that did not undergo variations and transformation. 
Political culture, as other kinds of culture such as the religious or the social ones, is 
a phenomenon that undergoes change and transformation, and Ottoman political 
culture was no exception. Furthermore, Ottoman political culture or the 
Weltanschauung was a synthesis of the foreign cultural influences that the 
Ottomans imbibed and made their own, despite various periods and trends of 
conservatism that reigned in Ottoman history. Therefore, it may be asserted that 
Ottoman political culture was sui generis with its cosmopolitanism, yet still 
remaining an oriental one as far as its Weltanschauung was concerned. 
The aim of this chapter is to show the continuity and also the discontinuity in 
modern Turkey, of the Ottoman political culture. The first question that crosses 
one's mind at this point is the Westernization process that the Ottomans as well as 
the Turkish Republic underwent - yet again as a continuity from the Ottoman 
Empire - starting at the end of the eighteenth century. The work is not a study on 
the Westernization process of the Ottomans or of Turkey. On this subject, there 
exists a large variety of studies undertaken by Turkish as well as Western 
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academics. This is a matter of discontinuity as well as continuity from the Ottoman 
heritage: continuity, because the westernization process was not born with modem 
Turkey, but it is the continuation of a process started by the Ottomans and carried 
on by bureaucrats of Ottoman upbringing in Turkey. It is at the same time a 
discontinuity because the infiltration of the western Weltanschauung in the 
Ottoman Empire was a foreign element whose successful outcomes are debatable 
for the Ottoman Empire. And also because the Westernization process was not a 
part of the successful synthesis-making nature of the Empire, whose forces were 
primarily of oriental, and not of occidental culture. 
It might further be questioned as to what the difference between oriental 
and western cultures is. There is a number of characteristics that differentiate the 
two cultures: while the western collective-mind (1) is analytical, the oriental one is 
synthetical, in other words, while the western collective-mind thinks in terms of 
differences, the eastern one thinks in terms of similarities. In a political sense, the 
oriental state usually thought in terms political unity, using cultural synthesis and 
obedience as a means of achiving this unity to merge the cultural differences within 
the subjects of a state in a single pot. Hence part of the difficulty of the western 
scholars in understanding the vast ethnic picture of the Ottomans as well as that of 
Turkey, in terms of self-identification and loyalty under a single state or authority 
figure. One may claim that the Ottoman as well as the modem Turkish political 
culture belongs to the synthetic collective mind category, rather than the analytical 
one. One point, however, should not be misinterpreted that the collective-identity 
is not the individual mind, and that the analytical and the synthetical minds need 
not be mutually exclusive. There is great affinity between this theory and the 
concept of a Turk on which the modem Turkish state is founded, as expressed by 
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M. Kemal Atatilrk: "Happy is the one who says I am a Turk'', and not who is 
necessarily, ethnically a Turk. So, even in the founding ideology of modem 
Turkey, we encounter the oriental outlook, where identification with the state is 
once again connected to loyalty rather than anything else, which is quite 
reminiscent of the Ottoman way.The continuity between the Republican period and 
the Ottoman Empire has almost been totally neglected by official history in Turkey. 
As Suraiya Faroqi elaborates, 
Turkish historians of the Republican period generally assume the 
existence of a clear break between the Turkish Republic and the 
Ottoman Empire. But at the same time they regard the Turkish 
Republic as a 'successor state' to the Empire in a sense that is quite 
different from the manner in which Yugoslavia Hungary or Greece 
are also 'successor states'. Therefore Ottoman and beylik period 
history are defined as a part of the national history of the Turkish 
Republic. However, this does not apply to classical Greek, Roman 
or Byzantine history, even though major sites of these civilizations 
are located in Anatolia and Thrace, and historians or archaeologists 
have occasionally suggested that the boundaries of national history 
be redrawn in order to include these disciplines as well. However, 
very few Turkish writers on history, often from outside the 
academic community,have emphasized continuities between the 
history of antiquity, Byzantium and the Ottoman period.For the 
most part, such continuities, mostly on the level of popular culture, 
have attracted the interest of journalists and literary figures opposed, 
in one way or another,to the notion of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis 
without the slightest leavening of cosmopolitan traits. Given the 
formidable barriers between academic · and non-academic 
intellectuals in present-day Turkey, such currents have had almost 
no impact upon established Ottoman historiography. Thus the 
beylik period is regarded as part of a long and glorious imperial 
tradition, and the 'primitiveness' or otherwise of state and society 
during this period becomes more or less irrelevant. (2) 
As seen from the above quotation, perhaps the greatest discontinuity 
between modem Turkey and the Ottoman Empire is the lack of recognition of the 
Turkish nation's cosmopolitan inheritance from the Ottomans. The irony is that, 
although Turkey is established on one eighth of the territories of its predecessor 
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(such was the ratio also in the payment of the debts of the Ottoman Empire by 
Turkey, established by the Lausanne Conference in 1923), and although the people 
of Anatolia remain mostly the same, apart from the Greek and Armenian 
population migrations, the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire has been lost. 
Perhaps, this may be regarded as one of the most tragic cultural losses as a 
consequence of the nationalistic trend of the last and the present centuries, which 
affected all the nations in this part of the world. 
· So what was the reason for this radical discontinuity and to what extent has 
it been beneficial to Turkey? The answer to the first part is relatively easier, 
however, the answer to the second part is a difficult one. The main reasons for the 
discontinuity that exists between the cosmopolitan character of the Ottoman 
Empire and the nation-state based ideology of Turkey is the general trend of the 
destruction of the world empire. The beginning of the 20th century not only 
witnessed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, but also that of the Habsburg, 
Russian and the British Empires. The reasons for the disintegration of these 
empires vary. However, it may be asserted that, the Ottoman Empire was 
completely at a loss and unprepared for the nationalistic developments within, 
because, until the very end, it hoped that the empire could be saved. It was also 
because of its totally different political culture from the western one, which 
followed a completely different course, that the new Turkish state based on the 
nation-state ideal (despite all its ethnic heterogeneities) had to impose this ideal 
from top towards the bottom. In other words, the nation-state of Turkey was not 
built as a consequence of the natural outcome of conflict and war among different 
classes within the society or of economic transformations which characterized the 
western nation-states. Rather, Turkey was built as a result of a war of 
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independence against perceived hostility from the West, whose political model 
Turkey copied. Ergun Ozbudun analyzes the difference between the western and 
the Ottoman political cultures in two stages: 
Two important features characterized the Ottoman political culture. 
One was the predominance of status-based values rather than 
market-derived values. This was the consequence of the 
bureaucratic nature of the Ottoman Empire ( ... ) Briefly stated, the 
fundamental relationship under Ottoman rule between economic 
power and political power was essentially the reverse of the 
European historical experience: instead of economic power (i.e. 
ownership of the means of production) leading to political power 
(i.e. high office in the state bureaucracy), political power provided 
access to material wealth. (3) 
This attitude can still be observed in Turkish politics of today, in the 
unaccountability of the politicians to the voters, and politicians from often poorly-
educated backgrounds getting hold of political power as way of access to the state 
resources and wealth. In other words, in today's Turkey one encounters, 
especially after the death of the generation of the old Ottoman bureaucrats, an 
interpretation of democracy without the historical background of a natural 
evolution, and without the enlightenment of the old Ottoman bureaucratic spirit. 
So what Turkey seems to be left with today is, a shallow interpretation of 
democracy (without the historical-evolution background), and a totally 
unprofessional politician class without loyalty to the state and unaccountability to 
the people. This state of things, is naturally exacerbated by the natural oriental-
cultural tendency of the Turks towards submissiveness, passivity and fatalism. A 
political culture that worked well for a long time, without alien-cultural elements 
(i.e. without secularism or/and democracy) in the Ottoman Empire, with the 
westernization process, produced a totally uprooted political culture in Turkey. 
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This has been lacking the analytical sharpness, swiftness and rebelliousness of the 
West, and the devotion, sincerity and loyalty of the Ottomans to the state. 
The reason for this should be looked for in the very uprooting of the elite 
culture and leaving the functioning of the democratic mechanism into the hands of 
the little culture (as Ozbudun calls it), which had practically little or no experience 
of government in the Ottoman Empire. Ozbudun explains this cultural division as 
the follows: 
Another feature of the Ottoman cultural legacy has been the 
dichotomy resulting from the cultural division in Ottoman society 
between the palace (great) culture and the local or provincial (little) 
cultures. They presented two very distinct ways of life, with 
different operational codes, different languages (highly literary and 
stylistic Ottoman versus simple spoken Turkish), different 
occupations (statecraft versus farming and artisanship ), different 
types of settlement (urban versus rural) . . . and sometimes different 
versions of Islam (highly legalistic orthodox Islam versus often 
heterodox folk Islam). (4) 
As for the consequences, the current situation is not optimistic at all. The 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism as well as Kurdish nationalism seem to be the 
gravest political side-effects today. The issue of Kurdish nationalism will not be 
dealt with here, which may be considered as a continuity of the general trend of 
nationalism that affected the whole of the Middle East, starting from earlier on in 
this century. Rather, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism appears to be more 
relevant to the Ottoman political culture, due to the immense importance that Islam 
played in the Empire. 
As seen in the prevtous chapters, Islam has been only one of the 
components of the political culture of the Ottomans. Although an important one, it 
was not what primarily and solely made the Ottoman political culture. Therefore, in 
the Turkish context, if Islamic fundamentalism is defined as "going back to the 
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roots or fundaments", one should ask the question" which roots?". Probably, what 
the Turkish fundamentalists mean as their roots is a kind of idealized and romantic 
view of harmony and justice as well as power achieved by the Ottomans, due to 
their strong Islamic faith. However, we have seen that the strength of the Ottomans 
was not only the model they adopted from Islam, but rather from all the other 
forces like the Byzantine and the Turco-Iranian ones as well. 
One of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is certainly economic in nature. 
However, the cultural crisis that Turkey is undergoing, contributes much to 
fundamentalism. While the Kemalist state almost entirely turned its back on the 
Ottoman cultural heritage, with an antagonistic attitude towards any religious 
flavour in the society, especially at the beginning of the Republic, the new cultural 
revolution it brought could not replace the strength of the solidarity-creating 
nature of the old Ottoman culture. As a consequence, the secular and modern state 
gave a very strong cultural excuse as a tool to the fundamentalists. The 
fundamentalists monopolized "the glorious Ottoman cultural past" as if the rest of 
the Turkish nation were not its inheritors. Apart from retrospective fundamentalist 
fantasies, Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it is quite by force 
that the fundamentalists are adopting the legalistic orthodox version of Islam, since 
their ultimate aims have little in common with the interpretation of Islam of the 
Ottomans. The Ottomans incorporated non-Islamic political traditions under the 
Islamic umbrella. Although the sultans claimed to be the caliphs of all the Muslims, 
they were antagonistic towards other non-Sunni states. Whereas the 
fundamentalists not only support an all-Islamic unity, but are also known to be 
receiving economic support from even Shiite and Wahabi states. Understandably, 
the attitude may be attributed to the loss of supremacy in the Islamic world. Hence 
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the antagonism towards the west and its demonization, something that the 
Ottomans did not have as a cultural policy. The monopolization of the Ottoman 
culture by fundamentalists is criticized as the following by Rauf Tamer (contributor 
to one of the respected secular newspapers of Turkey): 
Look at the political spectrum. There are more than fifteen parties. 
Most of them are secularism champions. They have altogether 
turned their back at Mehmet the Conqueror. They have left the 
epoch-changing 1453 junction only to Refah's (the Islamist party of 
Turkey) monopoly. What a complex ... (They) cannot even tolerate 
a symbolical Mehter Band (Ottoman Military Band). How 
Europeanized they are. They are eating lahmacun (traditional 
Anatolian dish) with whisky, as if they came out of their mothers' 
wombs hearing the 9th Symphony (of Beethoven). We have left the 
mosque to them (Refah Party). We have left Newroz (spring feast) 
to the others (alluding to the Kurdish nationalists). I am Atatiirk's 
child as well as Mehmet the Conqueror's grandson. (5) 
The roots of the present-day picture of Turkey is explained as the following 
by SerifMardin, in the 1950s: 
The first effect of the foundation of the Turkish Republic can be 
seen in an activity that has negative connotations: the effort of 
getting away from Ottoman culture and Ottomanist ideals. This was 
not a new tendency; it was the accumulation of a tendency that 
gained momentum at the beginning of the 20th century. Cultural 
Turkism that developed on a firmer foundation, besides utopical 
Pan-Turkism, won over Ottomanism. Turkism, which developed on 
speculations of the uniqueness and high-culturedness of the ancient 
Turkish societies, developed the sufficient intellectual force to be 
born as a strong movement, before the Ottoman Empire fulfilled its 
well-known final destiny. The Republican government did not have 
any objections to this movement as long as it stayed a purely 
cultural one. On the contrary, the Turkist dogma was encouraged as 
an ideology to be given to the people, in the reconstruction period. 
As we reach 1937, the majority of the Turkish historiography is 
filled with the ancient history of the Turks( ... ) They were trying to 
develop a theory which claimed that the peoples living in the Turan 
land-- where the Turks were supposed to have come from-- had 
developed the most ancient civilizations on earth ( ... ) After this 
explanation, it will be more easily understood why research on 
Ottoman History coincides with the 1940's, after the death of 
Atatiirk. ( 6) 
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The ideological appeal of not only fundamentalism, but also of milder 
Islamic political theories of the present day could be better understood, for Turkey, 
after these remarks of Mardin. The old political culture seems to be gone and the 
new ideology of the state fails to attract a strong involvement. 
If an analogy were to be drawn, the Ottoman political culture pertaining to 
adherence to Islam was reminiscent of the theological nature of Hinduism, which is 
extremely ecumenical, the main belief of Hinduism being that of spiritual liberation 
or moksha by recognition of the various incarnations of the Divine. It matters little 
in Hinduism whether one adheres to one of the Hindu trinity deities or to no deity 
at all, as long as one confesses to be a Hindu, and does not go against the 
ecumenical social solidarity structure. Likev.rise the interpretation of Ottoman Islam 
(though theoretically an orthodox interpretation) was in practice certainly of an 
ecumenical nature and permitted co-existence with other creeds. In fact, the use of 
religion both in India ( be it under Muslim or Hindu rulers) and in the Ottoman 
Empire were, and had to be based on multi-religious co-existence, both systems 
ruling extremely heterogeneous populations. Although exceptions occurred, both 
the political cultures were based on the principle of not alienating other religions 
different from that of the ruling elite or of the majority of the society. 
Seen from a historical perspective, it is curious that fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam adopt an orthodox interpretation rather than an ecumenical 
one. Whereas until the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, political reactions to 
the Ottoman central authority often took the form of heterodoxy or even of 
sectarian schisms ( as in the case of the Alawis today). For only after the firm 
establishment of the state as an empire that political opposition took the form of 
orthodox Islam, mainly from the sixteenth century onwards. 
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According to Ahmet Davutoglu, Islamic trends arise out of the loss of the 
relationship of authority that Islam confers to political leadership: 
Ibn Khaldun prefers the religious justification of the socio-political 
system together with a historical proof taken from Asr al-Sa'adah: 
( ... ) "In no period were the people left in a state of anarchy. This 
was so by general consensus, which proves that the appointment of 
imam is an imperative . . . The appointment of an imam is required 
by religious law, that is, by consensus." The same way of 
justification of the socio-political system and hierarchy was used by 
Shahrastani before Ibn Khaldun via the following statement: "The 
institution of the Imamate is attested by catholic consent from the 
first generation to our day in the words: 'the earth can never be 
without an imam wielding authority' ... Such a consensus of opinion 
is decisive proof of the necessity of the office... When Muhammed 
died none contested Abu Bakr's statement that a successor must be 
appointed.... The office has gone on from then until now either by 
general consent of the people, or by agreement and testament, or 
both." (7) 
Davutoglu goes on to explain the socio-political system envisaged by Islam, stating 
that the distinction between the profane and the sacred, of the religious from the 
secular, or of the temporal from the moral does not exist in Islam. (8) This may be 
considered as a factor of alienation for the people born within an Islamic context 
like Turkey, whose new face is characterized by the divison of the profane and the 
sacred and of the secular and the religious, not only in political, but also in social 
life. As seen by Davutoglu, this de-sacralization of the culture, not only in the 
Islamic countries but also in the West, gave birth to the latest spiritual movements, 
which are characterized by a holistic and an ecumenical approach towards life in 
general. (9) 
Ursula M1.h<;1yazgan attributes this divisionist and dualistic character of the 
West to the horizontal division-line that characterizes the Christian attitude towards 
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the profane and the sacred. According to Mtlw1yazgan, the politico-social structure 
of the West was built upon the horizontal division in the human being, dividing 
man from the waist upwards, until the modern times ( alluding to the division 
between the human and the animal natures of the human being). She claims that 
the divison in western society still continues, having shifted upwards from the 
waist-level to the head-level, dividing the individual from all what is intellectually 
intelligible and the rest which is not within the realm of the intellect. She goes on to 
explain that an individual ( i.e. (in)dividual) from an Islamic background is bound 
to be frustrated and alienated, who is born in a political environment with a 
horizontal-dividing line. ( 10) 
After having explained the horizontal divison-line theory, it must be clearer 
how a political ideology based on Islam - a highly prescriptive and role-attributing 
religion, inspired by the political dimensions of the wahdah al-wujud (unity) 
principle - becomes an alternative to the alienation of the individuals, who are born 
within the cultural heritage of a similar oriental culture as that of the Ottomans, 
where social and political roles were meticulously prescribed according to deeply-
rooted tradition. 
As a result, one may claim that there is a paradoxical continuity as well as a 
discontinuity in Turkey of the Ottoman political culture. Some of the forces of 
continuity are: a still highly-centralized government, a submissive nation 
characterized by passivity and lack of intellectual inquisitiveness, and a highly 
unaccountable political tradition to the people. Whereas the forces of discontinuity 
that were mentioned, such as the religion-state relationship will, for the foreseeable 
future, continue to be a cultural as well as a political problem. It seems that either a 
reconciliation with history, or a brand-new cultural outlook is needed to get out of 
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the identity crisis in which Turkey finds itself Another alternative is a solution by 
the synthesis of the above mentioned alternatives, which appears to be a healthier 
approach. 
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CHAPTERS 
5. CONCLUSION 
All things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason 
that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable. 
Does not almost every precise history of an origination 
impress our feelings as paradoxical and wantonly offensive? 
Does the good historian not, at bottom, constantly 
contradict? (1) 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
Perhaps the greatest contradiction in the process that gave birth to modern 
Turkey is its Ottoman heritage. Although there are still many detectable elements 
of Ottoman cultural influence in Turkey, at least the official ideology seems to 
ignore this legacy. According to Oral Sander (2), Turkish foreign policy may be 
epitomized by two main principles. First, that of maintaining peaceful and 
cooperative relations with the eastern neighbours; second, improving cooperation 
and partnership relations with the West. In the light of these principles, one 
encounters an even greater contradiction from a historical perspective. Although 
both the Ottomans and the Turks, since the 1071 Manzikert battle, oriented the 
direction of their advancement towards the West, it was with the political and 
military supremacy that the West encountered the Ottomans. The situation seems to 
be reversed today. Since it is by the rules of the West which evolved in a natural 
historical development, created by the western mind and experience, that Turkey is 
supposed to play, not only the international politics game but also the domestic 
one. 
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One can argue whether the international game could be played by any other 
rules than those valid and accepted by the international community. The answer 
would probably be a negative one, at least until some alternative by the East is 
created. It seems that the alternatives proposed, such as Islamic movements, are 
often radical and present themselves with anti-western solutions. However, there is 
one important aspect that should be reconsidered, leaving behind the readily 
accepted dogmas that are imposed from a mono-cultural standpoint. As tried to be 
proven by this thesis, there is a connotational mistake often committed by the East 
and the West together. That is, the identification of a political culture with Islam. 
Islamist Weltanschauungs appear to be almost the only alternative presented 
against the western political culture in the contemporary era. 
As seen in the previous chapters, one has a range of historical experiences of 
states built and successfully continued on the Eastern model, which were indeed 
not Islamic states. Pre-Islamic Persia from whom Byzantium took the oriental state 
tradition, is one of them. Byzantium, or the Eastern Roman Empire is yet another 
example of a state which was deeply influenced by Christianity, and at the same 
time was also built on the oriental model. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
Mauryan Empire in India is another example of an oriental state whose rulers 
accepted Buddhism in the third century B.C.(who were Hindus before) as their 
religion. These examples are of particular importance since the Ottomans directly 
or indirectly were affected by certain elements of their political culture, yet 
incorporating them in their Empire whose elite was certainly Muslim. 
By these criteria, Islam is not synonymous with the oriental, as no other 
religion is either. 
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The capacity of synthesis-making and of coexistence with different religions 
and peoples, seemed to be what characterized the spirit of Anatolia from 
immemorable (the word is not used rhetorically here) times until the twentieth 
century, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, the inheritors of 
this culture in the Anatolian lands seem to have forgotten this positive and 
integrating character of the Orient. Instead, the new model on which Turkey is 
based, i.e. the western culture, is largely a culture which had little experience with 
coexistence of different religions, though it had an experience of coexistence of 
different races. 
It should be made clear that the aim of this work, was not to prove the 
superiority or the inferiority of either the eastern or the western cultures. The 
demonization of the West, on the contrary, udertaken by fundamentalist Islamists is 
bound to give birth to inimical and unproductive relationships in the future between 
the two hemispheres, enlarging the cultural misunderstanding that is already there. 
Ironically, one may claim that fundamentalist views in Turkey fail to understand 
the Geist of even their own culture. Especially given the fact that the Ottomans 
were not even only Muslims, but inheritors of the Eastern Romans, this 
misinterpretation of a modem spirit like Islamic fundamentalism should become 
clearer. Otherwise, the study of history would appear to be a futile intellectual 
exercise. 
The Ottoman Empire, one might claim, certainly belonged to the oriental 
culture. It interacted but did not necessarily coexist with the West. On the other 
hand, Turkey has the task of both coexisting and of interacting with the West 
today. To make this coexistence easier, the first step to be taken is primarily to 
inquire and find out more about the culture with which the Turks of Anatolia are 
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raised. The official political culture in Turkey certainly does not encourage this, 
neither does it provide the necessary mind-frame and the intellectual formation to 
enable this process of reconciliation with one's own past, on the contrary, it creates 
a kind of self-denial leading up to a schizophrenic attitude. There was not a single 
politician in Turkey, or an official spokesman who did not, somehow, try to cover 
up the oriental aspect of Turkey. The first step towards a healthy outlook onto the 
world as well as ones own country passes through introspection. In other words, 
the motto of "know thyself' was neglected for too long a time, whose side-effects 
are visible in the ever-deteriorating Turkey-West relations. 
After having determined the problematique, there may be a suggestion of 
two kinds of solutions: 
The first one is based on the capacity of synthesis-making of the Turks in 
particular, due to their nomadic flexibility (3), and of all the empires that existed in 
Anatolia, of synthesis-making ability. In other words, Turkey may (presuming that 
the above mentioned reconciliation is successfully accomplished) make an organic 
synthesis of the eastern and the western political experiences. Some rhetoric in 
Turkey goes along the so-called East-West synthesis, undertaken by the 
intelligentsia, however, one may claim that what the Turkish intelligentsia refers to 
as an East-West synthesis is rather a bricolage of the two cultures going in two 
parallel lines and never meeting each other. This situation brings into one's mind 
the question: "Could the East and the West merge in a synthesis?". A 
mathematician would answer the question by the geometrics theory that two 
parallel points meet at the point of infinity. The answer to this question still remains 
open. 
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The second solution that might be suggested is that Turkey comes up with an 
alternative political culture to that of the West, which may be inspired by the 
political culture of the Ottomans. However, the obstacles standing in front of this 
solution are immense. Turkey is not yet stable within the political framework it 
promised itself to obey. So undertaking such a grande politique at an ideological 
level seems to be far beyond the grasp of the politicians, and the intelligentsia is not 
genuinely interested in such ideological architecture, being too much involved in 
the daily petite politique. 
As a conclusion, the aim of this work has been to present the cultural 
dimensions of politics from a historical perspective. It is relatively easy to describe 
the problematique, however, much more difficult to come up with solutions. 
Therefore further work should be encouraged in this field by academics. Finding a 
feasible solution is far beyond the scope of this work. However, one fact must have 
appeared quite clearly, that the cultural dimensions will play an ever-increasing role 
in domestic as well as international politics, the ignorance and negligence of which 
may well lead to rather grave consequences. 
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